Catastrop(h)ic

Volume I: Bombs, Outsideness, and the Horizon of Insurrection

1. Acknowledgements

2. Our Insanifesto

1. Introduction

Our culture claims, and exclaims the need for recognition. Our school demands to be heard. What we conceive as our culture is merely our common, mutual and self-advancing understanding of what truly is to be done. Our words might hide our will, but our concepts will not. Inherently, the state of what we see, what we receive, is nothing but pure disappointment. Our claim for the great theories of old, and our will to use them as a basis, a flatline basis upon which we seek to go further than what has already been theorized, is by now not enough. Sadly, our pretension to understand and deconstruct the several complex machineries that oppress us has been recuperated and reorganized, losing its principle of ruthless battling against all that is present. We have seen way too much go unnoticed by our peers and not enough constructed by our own.

In simpler terms, we are outraged.

Simply not enough can be conceived with the present state of the theorists of our modern time, and no one escapes it ; from academia to radical circles, they have all fallen under the trap of the spectacle. In itself, the thought of the now has become an accumulation of commodified ideas, ones not only rotating around for too long, but also lacking the creative and blissful vision that deconstruction implies. Political organizations tend towards prescriptive application of alternative liberal administrative forms, inherently continuing what is already total. Philosophers tend towards reactionarism, with a conservative ethos on the rise in the fight against the same system they desire, deep down, even below their libido. The internet itself, as we wrongly assume to be a unitary form of hivemind thought, does not escape the imposed restrictions of the outside world. The Rhizome that now directs our purchases, translates our messages and delivers our emotions will not come to save us, this internet in the age of technocapital will never be able to help us, the lost ones, as Andrew Culp would put it. Lost are the times where at least this space represented a battle ground, a radical alternative to what the oppressed lived, as it has now modelled itself around the worst forms of alienating cult-form groups (i.e The Fandom form) or purely an image of the most self-sensored and miserable ideas the current world represses, but does not oppose.

This passiveness in all realms that touch the understanding in society has led to the deception of peoples all throughout the world. The global tides are not changing, but instead adopting a violent uniformisation of systems via alternative forms of empire that has destroyed our bonds, and with it, the ability to blissfully create. As for this, our attack is against the forms of thought that normalise us and coerce us into compliance. No longer

can we stand still against the world of Capitalism, we seek its overcoming. This project is violent, our war is not fair as long as the opponent isn't either. These forms we undertake to stand against the conspiracy against our conspiracy is nothing but the battle against affirmation itself. Terrible things keep happening every day, yet we are unable to help, to act, and to destroy our shackles: why does man fight for its own servitude? Or better yet, why would man let that servitude be to begin with? Because we are victims, victims of the un-creative, of the unimaginative, of the essential, of the objective intersubjectivity that tears us down, and our subversive identities one by one, day by day. The dusk of capitalism is our goal, our lifestyle and our praxis, we live and breathe the war against capitalism because capitalism gets into our breath by the daily, with its propostruous eco-cidical fumes we are shackled to and the terrifying future that awaits us if we cannot overcome this one leviathan, one coming from the space and time of the tragedy to alert us in more ways than one.

In order to create the true post-capitalist desire, we must for once, posit our program, one not of prescription, but description. A program in which we theorize the end of our oppression, because the mines of action of our fellow humans have been recuperated to no end. Because we claim the official opposition to the academia that pacifies us. Because us, the theorists of the capitalist realist era, need to be heard. Here we present to you our points, the axioms of our thought and the aphorisms of our opinions. Here we present the project of what our group seeks; a not so secret plan to enable our glorious weapons to advance past our current time. The artistic conspiracy that does not escape the world, but confronts it. No longer is this a fight for escape, this is a struggle for us, and the survival of our pact that so far has given us nothing but the pleasures of the liberatory guide of mankind. In short, we seek renewal, one more atomized than ever before. We seek to be free, more free than ever. We seek to be something else, we seek to be more than we ever could.

"Thought is no longer theoretical. As soon as it functions it offends or reconciles, attracts or repels, breaks, dissociates, unites or reunites; it cannot help but liberate or enslave. Even before prescribing, suggesting a future, saying what must be done, even before exhorting or merely sounding an alarm, thought, at the level of its existence, in its very dawning, is in itself an action- a perilous act."

— Michel Foucault

2. Towards Dangerous Theory

1. Philosophy today is overburdened by Academia, a stale and boring institution that formalises and pacifies the process of thought. Thought is allowed to venture freely within closed boundaries, providing either a justification of the current state of affairs or a recuperated and pacified alternative. We posit that thought needs to once more become dangerous.

2. Analytic philosophy is a dead field, a discipline ruled by essentialist argumentation and various diverse set theories attempting to posit itself as a foundation. While, like all philosophy, their discipline has various insights that can be drawn upon, it has been at its very core pacified.

3. Contemporary continental philosophy has gone in a myriad of directions, reflecting the postmodern epoch that the field described starting in the late sixties. The field has become disparate and divided. Stuck in various debates on post-Kantian metaphysics and intersectionality, continental philosophy has too become pacified.

4. There is a definitive lack of creativity within the present theoretical space, any attempt at revolutionary construction finds itself stuck within the confined bonds of the pre-established neoliberal territory. Rebellions only walk through the avenues already paved, surrounded by walls already built that they wish not to disturb. Artistic fervour has been abandoned for the sake of straight analytics, as a result of this the revolutionary movement finds itself impotent, undynamic, and unmovable.

5. That is not to say that there is no potential in contemporary theory, the descendants of the post-structural milieu continue to give useful insight into the current state of the world. However like its larger discipline it has become stuck in a multiplicity of directions, any radical potentiality lost among a sea of alternatives.

6. Deleuze and Guattari were more right than they could have known in their prescription to "make thought a war machine" within *A Thousand Plateaus*. The proposition to make thought more dangerous, to make thought opposed to the forms of social mediation we see today, is the only option left to take.[1]

7. Academic papers have only brought information and conscience so far, creating revolutionary thought, but maintaining them confined into the alienating field of

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[1] Deleuze, Gilles, and Félix Guattari. 1977. *A Thousand Plateaus*. N.Y.: Viking Press.

academia, which through the organisation of the system exists for most as a separate dimension from what is useful in their lives. What human history teaches however is that myth and art have been important weapons against the present system as well as unifying rallying cries for individuals caught sympathising with the artistic feel and message of a particular art piece. It is no coincidence that every political movement that cast iconoclastic waves unto the order it found itself in also participated in a symbiotic relationship with a creative movement that allowed both movements to develop while learning from each other and magnified each of their destructive powers.

8. Our aim is to make theory more dangerous, more destructive. This destruction is not one of simple pure negation, but one of creative destruction. The goal is to make theory itself a war machine against the various apparatuses of capture seen in today's political scene.

9. If theory today is a desert, one mirroring the descriptions of the wider world given by Tiqqun, then we are a nuclear test.[2] We mirror a thermonuclear bomb in our destructive potential towards contemporary discourse. If Deleuze and Guattari declare war on contemporary discourse, we will make it nuclear.

10. The weapon necessary to break down the neoliberal constructs that bind academia today is not one born out of simple engineering or chemistry, rather it is a multidisciplinary weapon, it must be constructed with artistic fervour, radical theory, and warlike insurrectionary praxis. Same as how the nomad knew no specialisation, rather being a master of all activities a nomadic life requires, our bomb is made by a combination of theories and turns to ashes everything in its field of impact.

11. The post-structuralists have deconstructed every last inch of the metaphysical systems, the sacred causes, the essentialisms, etc of old. All they did not touch were deconstructed by their predecessors, such as Stirner and Nietzsche, or will come to be deconstructed by future theorists. Any who hold to the essentialist theories and causes of old are the same as those who remain religious in the wake of god's death.

12. Deconstruction regulated only to the end goal of deconstruction is the ultimate pacification of the most radical tendency in contemporary philosophy. The most critical thinkers find their destructive potential regulated to the tearing down of the

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[2] Tiqqun. 2017. Theory of Bloom.

metaphysical systems of old. This destructive capacity must be redirected towards a destructive affirmation.

13. The deconstructionists, following from Heidegger, proclaim the death of metaphysics, at least as a tool for proclaiming absolute truth. Our aim should not be to reconstruct a metaphysics of truth, but one of creative destruction. There is no attempt to construct any system, but instead to create dangerous concepts.

14. Connectivism, as Culp calls it[3], has largely been co-opted by the circuits of capital. It is no secret that the rhizome in our cybernetic age is the very structure that capital takes. This has been observed by a large variety of theorists from those of autonomia to Žižek. Pacification has taken place even inside of the realm of the drive towards what is, on itself, wild, unimaginable and, a priori, unrecoupable.

15. Culp calls upon us to no longer create new concepts, but to negate the world as we know it[4]. We must do both, we must engage in the conceptual equivalent of Marcel's "Communism of Attack and Withdrawal.[5]" Creative destruction is the path forward; free affirmation becomes our ultimate goal and our best ally at that. A connectivity of both, not on special symbiosis or synthesis, but pure complementarity, one not possible if we continue to oppose both, or essentialize what becomes our newly found form for "creative destruction".

16. With this ongoing deconstruction a path forward must be offered. All existing paths beyond the era of deconstruction, such as those offered by Foucault, Deleuze, Guattari, etc, must be further radicalised. They must become more destructive, more explosive. Our aim is not to create new systems, nor to merely deconstruct, but to engage in theoretical warfare. A decentralised guerilla warfare on the essential, the ill-constructed and the prescribed.

17. We are not the first to attempt this, far from it in fact. Various post-Marxists, post-anarchists, Tiqqunists, etc all attempt a similar approach. Much like their forebears they must be taken from and radicalised. The civil war that Tiqqun declares must become a total war.

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[3] Culp, Andrew. 2016. *Dark Deleuze*. U of Minnesota Press.
[4] Ibid.
[5] Marcel. 2017. *Communism of Attack and Communism of Withdrawal*.

18. Our aim is to go beyond the post-structuralists, to make their theory a weapon among many in the theoretical war of ruthless critique. The ultimate aim is to make this theoretical war a practical one, to liberate and communize. However senseless academic work, stuck and pacified, is fruitless, as is senseless action without goals. The struggles must be merged, civil war must be expanded on all fronts.

19. To use theory as a weapon is to both free it from the constraints of pacified academia, to make the weapons of the theoretical in tandem with the weapons of praxis, and to make it freely available to both use and abandon as one sees fit. This is an approach similar to that of For Ourselves![6] and McQuinn[7]'s notion of self theory, the former following a more communist variety while the latter makes it supposedly critical.

20. Both conceptions of self theory make this free flowing theoretical approach segregated from the action it hopes to inspire. We must go beyond this conception, we must posit theory not as the inspiration for action but as action itself. We are not the forebears of a coming revolution, its theorists, but rather militants with our personal weapons: theory itself.

21. This is not to separate our purpose from practical concerns of praxis, but to merge the two. Oh of course, participate in the riots, engage in insurrectionary activity, the human strike, etc. We know how it is to be done, we simply seek to bring theory into the fold. The war machine must expand on all fronts, attacking all hegemony. This is not a program for the war to come, this is but another shot being fired in our current state of global war.

22. Marx was very correct when he posited in *Theses on Feuerbach[8]* that the point of philosophy is to change the world. This requires active change at the level of everyday activity based not on transcendent goals. Despite this the Marxists of today talk of a world to come, that we through the true movement will build towards. Our weapons of theory cannot be made to support some far off future, but rather to engage in the active process of war as is. **Our change comes not from goals, but from process.**

23. Liberatory change comes not through readily defined movements of change, nor through the storming of heaven to find a seemingly perfect state of things, rather it

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[6] For Ourselves. 2020. *The Right to Be Greedy*. Pattern Books.
[7] Mcquinn, Jason. 2014. *Critical Self-Theory*.
[8] Marx, Karl, and Friedrich Engels. (1846) 1995. *The German Ideology*. New York: International Publishers.

starts from a radical creativity in both thought and action. Creativity is the most important weapon any radical has, as it allows us to not take the ruling concepts at face value. Only through a radical creativity can any radical action be taken, only through this creativity can any liberatory change occur.

24. One concept today's left places in high regard, as do we, is the notion of capitalist realism, taken from the late Mark Fisher. For our purposes capitalist realism is the social phenomena that makes illusory concepts and apparatuses such as the state, capital, etc become real and totalizing. Through our participation in and acceptance of these cultural phenomena they invade the real. To, in Fisher's terms, imagine new futures is to be radically creative, to think beyond our current position. Regardless of any notion of praxis, this must always be the starting point.

25. The only way to overcome the becoming real of capital and other apparatuses is to engage in a pure affirmation, to create concepts as weapons and deny the becoming real of all apparatuses of capture. We must not create a new dominant system to rule the mind, but instead oppose any totalizing system of thought. A pluralism of weapons is needed, a rhizome if you will, but brand new, oppositional and derivative. The ultimate weapon against the various apparatuses of capture is an unfettered creativity of both thought and action.

26. **What then is this group?** We are not a vanguard of some messianic revolution. It is not our goal to offer a program of any sort. Nor is it to offer yet another perspective in the already over bloated and pacified scene of radical theory. Rather we seek to build weapons, to point out cracks, ultimately seeking to aid the fight for liberation. This liberation, Communization, insurrection, individuation, call it what you will, is a horizon both far off and imminently close at once.

27. Our group thus must not segment itself into labels or structures, it should not oppose any influence upon its thought. Any limitation or stratification upon the creation of dangerous concepts leads to a new zone for recuperation. While the specific labels and groups that proclaim a radical perspective can be recuperated, its content cannot. For a true movement, no matter its name, can never become recuperated. We attempt to apply what this true movement must be isolated to the group itself, to potentially go further.

28. Miliband's study *The State in Capitalist Society*[9] concludes that to avoid the degeneration of radical organisations they must model the society they wish to create. In his case this means that these organisations must become radically democratic, loose, and federated. While Miliband's study is overall correct in its analysis, though it does not see the intricacies of what he critiques, his conclusion on democratic organisation is incorrect. This is because he remains committed to the new left delusion of radical democracy.

29. Instead what we should take from Miliband is that our organisations must model itself off of the idea of pure affirmation. We are not rigid in our creation of dangerous concepts, rather the group is an unfettered expression of personal creativity. The idea of communism, not as it is expressed by Badiou or Žižek as a potential egalitarian reality, but instead as an unmediated social reality, must become the basis of the organisations of the group.

30. Tiqqun and their disciples state that communism is lived, both in the process of communization and through the participation within struggle through the outside. While an unmediated space certainly doesn't exist, nor can there be any physical outside as Dauvé and Endnotes have proved, the movement itself can be lived. The goal of this group is to live communism in the process of theory itself, to use concepts as our weapons in the global scene of civil war.

31. The idea of living communism through the group structure is not a new one. The Italian and Dutch-German left in their proposed forms, the party form and the council form, seek to model their vision of communism in how they organise themselves. Bordiga's organic centralism models communism in its political expression of the proletariat, as does the council form. Both express an idea of communism as an association of producers.

32. Much like the conception of the radical group given by Miliband, we find in traditional ultra-left forms a faulty conception of the living of communism. Both the Italian and Dutch-German forms rely on a workerist affirmation of the proletariat, a form of political expression that models the eventual form of communism. What we require is not communist politics, but communist anti-politics. The affirmation of the proletariat as the proletariat does not work to abolish the class, but rather entrenches a fundamental workerism.

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[9] Miliband, Ralph. 1969. *The State in Capitalist Society*. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson.

33. Communism, as we will come to see, is not a free association of producers but instead the abolition of all social mediation. As such the model of our group must be unmediated and freely affirming. Concept production occurs within every text, each one interrelated yet radically different. Each seeks a new sense of outsideness, a new crack to expand.

34. The group is not a rhizome, nor a mapping. A perfectly rhizomatic micro-politics of connection is to fight these various apparatuses as a new form of apparatus. Rather what is needed is not micro-politics but anti-politics. Goodbye schizo-revolution, long live schizo-insurrection. **Our connections are invisible, unmediated. We never seek to be in the middle of a structure, but rather outside it.**

3. A More Ruthless Critique

35. Radical theory is in an identity crisis, as the scene is pulled apart in a myriad of directions. Anyone who wishes to become a radical has a near-infinite supply of labels and theories to satisfy their desire for radicality. Radicality is now preformative, one of many courses one can take in one's search for any semblance of authenticity. Yet this radicality offers no means of escape or liberation, only new recuperated directions. Anywhere one turns there is a new label to encounter, a new prison towards creativity.

36. We shall call this state of radical theory over-labelization. As is the case with all academic matters, this lack of direction directly reflects the lack of direction found within the postmodern era more generally. Just as the post-structuralists in their critique of traditional semiotics realised that the signifier dominates and reduces any signified, all labels dominate and reduce any radical viewpoint.

37. This over-labelization is a symptom of the confinement that philosophy finds itself in more generally, rather than any creative destruction emerging from the currents of discourse and struggle. People only seem to be able to take the debris from this destruction to build themselves another jail, political and philosophical thought does not find itself running free, rather it slowly becomes muffled as recuperation occurs en masse.

38. Let us be clear that this is no call for "unity," whatever that would imply. We don't deny the differences in view found within radical theory. The little microcosm of theory that we inhabit is indeed differentiated from every other microcosm. However what is not to be emphasised is a politics of conceptual or relative difference. This is the difference of the molar, a difference defined by the differences between categories. Rather what is to be emphasised is Deleuze's politics of difference, a difference that is preconceptual. To do this is to reject categorization, to let dangerous theory roam free.

39. This politics of difference is neither a call to differentiate ourselves for the sake of it or to unite politics upon some central point of differentiation. Rather it is to allow unique expression and affirmation. In the realm of theory this requires a rejection of the current trend of over-labelization. The proliferation of labels is the proliferation of molar worldviews that offer nothing constructive towards the development of

radical theory. Would be radicals choose or rather "shop" for labels that limit their perspective.

40. The creation of labels is to be differentiated from the creation of concepts. Concepts in semiotic terms require both a signifier and signified. Though the signified is certainly dominated or alienated by the dominant signifier, there is certainly something being expressed. Over-labelization can never hope to find expression in its proliferation of worldviews. Instead its signifiers are empty, merely different signs one can refer to. The label is floating, something one can grasp onto for a sense of political identity.

41. A return to radical philosophy, in contrast to the trend of over-labelization, implies creative destruction and pure affirmation. Radical philosophy must fundamentally challenge our preconceived structures of thought, to constantly innovate thought itself. To do this requires the rejection of any label that grounds a concept in a theoretical territory. Communists, anarchists, call us what you will. Our only real positive position is the overall radicalization of theory.

42. Despite all claims for innovation, any creative destruction within the theoretical space must be informed by the ideas of those that came before. One notion that we have already reviewed in depth is the critique of the logic of place given by various post-structuralist thinkers. However this approach often leaves us without any real room to expand into practical matters. The claim to an outside found within these approaches is often faulty, though our own contribution will be added later to this concept. In short the outside can only be found in the space before any conceptualization or recuperation, in life and experience itself. This was observed by Newman in his commentary on Lacan's category of the real[10], and was previously realised by both Vaneigem[11] and Tiqqun[12] in their notions of a politics of everyday life.

43. What needs to be turned to in order to unleash any theoretical destruction as any real liberatory force is a rebirth of Marx's ruthless critique of all that exists. This attitude takes nothing as given and leaves nothing outside the realm of analysis and critique. Marx's attitude is what allows for such a refined critique of capitalism offered in *Das*

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[10] Newman, Saul. 2001. *From Bakunin to Lacan : Anti-Authoritarianism and the Dislocation of Power*. Lanham, Md.: Lexington Books.
[11] Raoul Vaneigem. 1967. *The Revolution of Everyday Life*. London (85 Regent's Park Rd, Nw1 8Xa): Action Books.
[12] Tiqqun. 2010. *Introduction to Civil War*. Los Angeles ; Cambridge, Mass. ; London: Semiotexte.

Kapital[13]. This is not a sense of contrarianism, which does not allow for anything constructive, but instead a necessary step in any project of affirmative change. Our call to make theory dangerous once more is simply the rebirth of the Marxist attitude to theory.

44. Another theorist embodying this attitude of ruthless criticism is Friedrich Nietzsche. As Deleuze once described, Nietzsche is a thinker that holds little gems of creative potential hidden in a myriad of reactionary assumptions. Just like Deleuze, any thinker of ruthless criticism must embody and take from what Nietzsche has done for philosophy. Nietzsche is a thinker that philosophy cannot return from. After Nietzsche, god truly died, all further attempts to resurrect him revived a zombie god. Without any religious foundation, or one based in rationality or whatever seemingly stable basis one could think of, one is forced into a radical reconsideration of values. Nihilism becomes revealed as the base of all notions, and yet one that is fully creative. All liberatory projects are simply one further step in Nietzsche's revaluation of all values, the full assertion of the will to power.

45. Everything that is shall be criticised and destroyed, the icon that they've become in their state of being-sacred will be shattered and rejected, theory is to roam free in an attack that is all strategic, tactical and at the same time all-reaching.

46. This new iconoclasm will not take form purely in iconic fashion, as if seeing itself as a crusade against a real enemy, it sees the impossibility in killing phantasm and does not wish to set up a new icon. Rather, this process shall be done by taking the holy icon and deconstructing it, mocking it, treading over it and devouring it, thus revealing it as empty and meaningless.

47. The marble and stone of politics represent the freezing of any destructive force, in the moment that something falls into political strategy it becomes a statue, an icon, a static thing incapable of any reproduction, assimilated into the grander architecture of the system itself. Such is the case for any idea that decides to compromise and assimilate, to stop and to hold any of itself as sacred. Constant self-destruction and critique is the only way to keep the creative power flowing.

48. The Reason as to why Radical Politics are in the way they are is two pronged, it is part because of their defeat in the face of assimilation by Techno-Capital and part because of their own weakness and failure inherent to their way of functioning.

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[13] Marx, Karl. 1867. *Capital : Volume One*. New York: International Publishers.

49. Radical Politics and Theory have been assimilated into the spectacle, it has grasped them and absorbed them into being part of their structure, transforming previous opposition into pawns as Communists, Anarchists and Fascists simply become another natural part of the Liberal Democratic environment.

50. At the same time, this assimilation came about as a natural step in the life-cycle of most of these Radical Projects as they abandoned an iconoclastic view of politics for the sake of participation in the political project, defending a strict political dogma and playing power politics within the system, engraving these different ideologies into the system itself. Such a life-cycle can be more acutely seen and is more widely recognized in Marxism-Leninism and Social Anarchism, but is present in most Political Projects.

51. And so, Ruthless Critique of all That Exists must finally have it's rebirth, taking from the ashes it was left in after centuries of assimilation and lighting it aflame again as a great solar phoenix that will embody all that is destructive now and emanate that flame into the whole world, burning everything that is. We will not return to Marx's Ruthless Critique of all That Exists as that would go against the very concept of it, just as we will not return to anything, instead, Ruthless Critique will only come about at the moment where everything past and present is offended, burned and broken."

4. A Contemporary Communism

52. What does it mean to be a communist today? The term is one that has been stretched and split into too many meanings to count. Of course there is the communism of Marx and Engels, the common association of producers, but there is a myriad of developments and distortions of the term that has come about since then. There is the communism of the Soviets, which merely managed capitalist relations through new forms. Yet the collapse of the Soviets has done something peculiar to the notion of communism. While once the public had a concrete example of communism, a grounding point, this no longer exists. The signifier of communism has begun to float.

53. This is of course symptomatic of our previous diagnosis of radicality. Radical theory has become over-labeled, to the point that representative thinking has clouded any potential for radicality. Mark Fisher's capitalist realism[14], which was touched upon earlier, also comes to mind here. Capitalist realism can after all be attributed to the domination of the becoming-real of various apparatuses. Our goal, regardless of what label we put to it, is the refusal of this becoming-real. To us, this seems to be the only real radical action left to take.

54. Might we call this refusal, this creative destruction, communism? Close, but not quite. This refusal is an insurrectionary movement on the level of both theory and praxis. Insurrection is perhaps what we will call the production of communism, it is the production of the object rather than the object itself.

55. However this object is no ordinary one, communism cannot be called a mode of production in the usual sense. Of course from a traditionally Marxist perspective this would most certainly be the case. Communism to them is perhaps what we should call messianic, it is their secular replacement for heaven. Numerous theorists have made this point again and again, from Stirner to Camus. No we are not proposing a replacement for heaven, rather we call for life here and now.

56. Communism as an object must be immediately apparent out of the processes of its realisation. To state this in clearer terms: communism must be immediate. This is of course the core tenant of the communizers, though each particular branch carries this idea in a myriad of directions. Now we have no identification with this movement, as that would be to situate this group in a particular spot within the broader theoretical

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[14] Fisher, Mark. 2009. *Capitalist Realism: Is There No Alternative?* Winchester: Zero Books.

space. This cannot be avoided fully, however we don't wish for any semiotic commitments.

57. Regardless, our "answer" to the meaning of communism can perhaps become more clear. Communism is the end result of the culmination of insurrectionary activity. If insurrections break down boundaries between individuals, communism is a fully unmediated social. Now of course this idea is one which is not necessarily possible. After all without a mode of mediation there can be no effectively coded action or communication. Thus it would be best to rephrase it as such: communism is a social in which mediation is freely determined and manipulated.

58. Now to those familiar with the arguments of the post-structuralists and post-anarchists concerning the nature of the social, we can see that this reality is a direct assertion of the anarchic foundation the social is founded upon. Newman labels this idea as the war-model of society[15]. In his post-anarchism he finds that an anarchic project is made possible due to an ontological anarchy, to which anarchy is the complete expression.

59. Due to this and the fact of the immediacy of communism in any true radical movement, we can proclaim that liberation is not something that "will come" insofar as it is a future state that is worked towards, rather, it is lived through insurrection, only in this insurrectionary state can one find themselves in a liberated state, which emanates from them as insurrectionaries rather than being an outside state that would come.

60. Thus we are not fighters for any messianic utopia, but fighters for life itself. We are no longer content to merely survive, we wish to live. We are the most complete expression of opposition, one with a uniquely insurrectionary character.

61. The current opposition exists only in phantasm, as most political projects that aim to bring about some kind of change manage to be only fellow props in the spectacle of neoliberalism. Liberal democracy as it exists has assimilated and integrated all into its wider narrative, a rejection of its institutions only serves to legitimise the status quo, such as how not voting in protest of electoralism is electoralist participation. In order to destroy the neoliberal reality and bring about a full rejection of its reality it is necessary theory and praxis, hand in hand as one thing, it must strike the very logical

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[15] Newman, Saul. 2001. *From Bakunin to Lacan : Anti-Authoritarianism and the Dislocation of Power.* Lanham, Md.: Lexington Books.

foundation of the system, tearing down the theoretical walls alongside the political walls.

62. Revolutions have so far only brought about another system to rail against, as Vaneigem explained[16], the creative and destructive force that sparks revolution and serves to upend the previous system only ends up usurped by a revolutionary force that rebuilds from the ashes another system that despite noticeable differences will serve the same purpose as the previous one; the oppression of the individual. In order to avoid the cold cell of systematic thinking the new destructive theory must be ruthless and without limits, as well as eternally upheaving and iconoclastic, there shall not be a yearning for a status quo as its purpose will be solely to fight against it. It is in that fight against systems that the anarchist lifestyle defines itself.

63. The anarchist lifestyle is the expression of radicality on the individual level. When we theorists propose living communism, anarchy, or any other uniquely radical buzzword, we mean simply to try to live. Today living is impossible, one can only survive. Another life perhaps is possible, but it can only come about if some begin to *refuse*.

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[16] Raoul Vaneigem. 1967. *The Revolution of Everyday Life*. London (85 Regent's Park Rd, Nw1 8Xa): Action Books.

5. Outsideness?

64. Capitalism, as with any other dominant system, wants to stay dominant, and will use all of its resources to remain it. However, Capitalism is fundamentally different to every other economic system before it due to its incessant need for growth. It is a mechanical beast that feeds on anything in its path, incorporating every minuscule idea, item, act, or subsystem into its whirring maw, and as such will destroy any attempt at subversion through pacification by incorporation. Even so-called "revolutionary" ideas are intercepted, repackaged, and redistributed to paradoxically uphold Capitalism through its perceived subversion.

65. Capitalism is ordered, systematic, and structured. While Capitalism may be ever expansive and all encompassing, this does not mean that Capitalism is chaotic, fluid, or even mutable, rather it radically changes anything of substance into something that can fit inside its thick, frozen walls. Everything it touches is placed neatly into a box and filed away into the mutated sludge of information, ideology, entertainment, and education that Capitalism continuously pumps from within its depths.

66. The fight for LGBTQ+ rights is an example of something Capitalism has distorted to its advantage. A formerly radical movement challenging the very assumptions heteronormative society presents has been reduced to branded consumer products.

67. Another example of Capitalism's aggressive pacification is found within contemporary anti-Capitalist movements. In the modern age, anti-Capitalist sentiment has been commodified to such a degree that engaging in commonly accepted forms of anti-Capitalist praxis only tightens Capitalism's grip on humanity. Che Guevara shirts, unions for landlords, corporations, and police officers, monetized Trotskyist newspapers, sponsored YouTube videos from so-called "Socialist" content creators, boycotts, peaceful protest, all are compromised under the gaze of Capitalism. There was a time where anti-Capitalist action was a viable method of change, but around the time of Marx's death, the Capitalist machine grew to an unfathomable size that there was no longer a viable way to combat it systematically.

68. Capitalism cannot incorporate radical *dis*order, chaos, heat as the unfettered increase in atomic energy, as they are antonyms to Capitalism's titanium foundation of order. When chaos comes into contact with order, it reconstitutes the nature of that order into something that cannot be held down, thus releasing it from its shackled territory that Capitalism has forced it into.

69. Because this chaos and disorder are unable to exist within Capitalism, they exist exo-systematically, that is to say, outside of Capitalist territories. We may call these exo-systematic forces (or, perhaps, *unforces*) "outsideness."

70. Outsideness is not a megalithic category that locks in its concepts through ideology or ideal, rather it is merely an observation of that which is inherently un-Capitalistic. By naming these unforces outsideness we are not making a prescriptivist category that we are forcing things into, we are instead creating a set of things that we as humans are able to understand. Human minds are built to accept order and categorization, that is one of the reasons Capitalism has become such a monument, however, we can accept new forces into our minds through restrictive, retroactive, yet permissive categorization, which is what we have sought to do with the label of "outsideness."

71. These unforces we have named outsideness are boundless. For all intents and purposes, they do not exist in any tangible way for Capitalism to take hold of because they are antagonisms to Capitalism's nature. They are nature-less, they have no substance, no internal dogma, no rigid structure for them to cling to, and thus have no nature to conform to. They are destructive, they exist purely in relation to order and stability, and thus act entirely against insideness.

72. Any hope to do away with the current state of things must be rooted in this chaos and disorder that can only exist *outside* Capitalism. This is paradoxical, as it is impossible to produce outsideness from within Capitalism.

73. There is a remedy for this, however. Outsideness exists *alongside* Capitalism already. The existence of Capitalism does not nullify the existence of outsideness in its entirety, rather these iotas of the outside are merely left unincorporated. Like two parallel lines, Capitalism and outsideness do not interact with each other in any way *in their current forms*. The goal of any truly radical movement should not be to create an alternative system from within Capitalism, but to embrace the outsideness that can never mingle with Capitalism, and then use that outsideness to sublate all systems. A feat much easier said than done.

74. An even more radical way to think about outsideness is that it doesn't "exist" at all, rather that it is the pure, unadulterated antagonism of Capitalism, that is to say, without the inside provided by Capitalist nature, there is no outside to draw upon.

75. Endnotes is right to critique the authors of *Call*[17] for relying on a physical outside. After all it is far more complicated than merely "leaving" capitalist society, whatever that would mean. Outsideness can only be experienced in moments of life, in moments where one is purely within the subjective. Newman in his text *From Bakunin to Lacan*,[18] discusses the problem of the outside in length. He is quite right to state that the outside can be realised only in what Lacan calls the real. The real is what is lost when one enters the realm of signifiers, it is our concrete experience of life and subjectivity. Vaneigem also contributes in length to this point in his text *The Revolution of Everyday Life*.[19] Regardless of our theoretical source the goal is the same, return to life and deny capitalism's becoming-real.

76. While chaos and disorder have always existed as antagonisms to ordered systems, their "unnature" has always been fundamentally different to outsideness. In other words, outsideness simultaneously is and is not chaos and disorder. What we have named outsideness represents a new strand in the para-historical development of resistance to systems.

77. Marx identified class conflict as the catalyst for societal change, be it economic, political, or social. This analysis is perfectly fine when looking at previous economic systems or even Capitalism during the time of Marx and perhaps directly after his death, but when looking at modern Capitalism, this analysis begins to unravel.

78. While it is true that class antagonisms drive much change, the way in which Capitalism has evolved (and how we have subsequently analysed it in this tretice) makes a view of class conflict in this way pointless, regressive, limiting, and even harmful.

79. As Tiqqun states in their text *This is Not a Program*, the division of society is no longer between two opposed molar wholes, but instead runs through us all. They write: "Historical conflict no longer opposes two massive molar heaps, two classes-the exploited and the exploiters, the dominant and dominated, managers and workers among which, in each individual case, one could differentiate. The front line no longer cuts through the middle of society; it now runs through the middle of each of

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[17] Anonymous. 2004. *Call*

[18] Newman, Saul. 2001. *From Bakunin to Lacan : Anti-Authoritarianism and the Dislocation of Power*. Lanham, Md.: Lexington Books.

[19] Raoul Vaneigem. 1967. *The Revolution of Everyday Life*. London (85 Regent's Park Rd, Nw1 8Xa): Action Books.

us"[20] Any liberatory project can now no longer affirm this molar whole, but cast the identification from oneself.

80. As mentioned earlier, we have seen countless examples of class antagonisms resulting in massive conflict (once again proving Marx correct), we are yet to see one of these conflicts result in anything other than an entrenchment of Capitalist ideology and a subsequent ruinous reterritorialization of anti-Capitalist movements.

81. As such we need to go much further. The workers' movement is dead, this is clear to all that can see. Exit from class is the future, not the assertion of class. Revolution has to transition once again to insurrection. The realisation of the outside can only come through a creative destruction, where relations are refused and new ones are freely created. To end we call all to live, not to live in a mediated or stratified manner, but to truly live. Refuse, deny, reconsider, assert oneself, and above all live fully. The gift of life and all its possibilities is today being wasted more than any other resource.

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[20] Tiqqun. 2011. *This Is Not a Program*. Cambridge, Mass ; London: Semiotexte.

3. Beyond Baudrillard

1. The Death of the Social

The scene of traditional Western philosophy as we know it today is composed of two major poles, the subject and the object. Subjects as we know them have active agency and act upon the other pole of the object. Objects have no agency in traditional thought, instead being simply being acted upon by subjects. Now the subject is not necessarily an individual, though it often is, but is rather an object like any other that has agency. A subject is an object that distinguishes itself from other objects by acting upon them beyond the mere logic of cause and effect. While we as individuals are categorised as subjects by this logic, though there are determinists who contest this, we can think up metaphysical situations in which anything can be a subject. All that has to be done is to give an object a sense of control. This paradigm can be traced back long before it was concretely theorised as a dichotomy by philosophers such as Descartes. It can be seen in the very structure of our language. In the structure of a sentence, there is a subject that acts through a verb on an object. The subject has a principle of action in language, without a verb there is simply no subject and thus no sentence. Structurally this means, as Orwell shows that the structure of language affects the way we think in his *Politics and the English Language*[21], that the subject-object dichotomy is ingrained in our thought process. Even if philosophically we were to construct a metaphysics that rejects this dichotomy, as so many thinkers of the post-modern milieu have done, the presence of some means of subject and object remains in our very thought process. It is a part of the standard image of thought.

Even if this dichotomy can be traced back so far in our collective consciousness, its philosophical justification is found in the work of the Enlightenment thinker Descartes. The very structure of his cogito, which he places as the basis for being, separates the mind and the body. He writes:

> "I easily understand, I say, that the imagination could be thus constituted if it is true that body exists; and because I can discover no other convenient mode of explaining it, I conjecture with probability that body does exist; but this is only with probability, and although I examine all things with care, I nevertheless do not find that from this distinct idea of corporeal nature, which I have in my imagination, I can derive any argument from which there will necessarily be deduced the existence of body."[22]

This may be seen as a separation of the subject into the source of agency within the subject, the mind, and that which is the extension of said agency, the body, but this separation of

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[21] Orwell, George. 1946. *Politics and the English Language*. Vol. 13. London: Penguin.
[22] Descartes, René. 1641. *Meditations on First Philosophy*. Cambridge University Press.

mind and body leads to the conclusion of the metaphysical poles of subject and object. When Descartes uses the ontological argument for god's existence he concludes that there must be an exterior world, that god would not trick him, thus giving an exterior of objects for the body, in control of the mind, to interact with and manipulate.

Now there have been significant challenges to this dichotomy and Descartes' which deconstruct this particular formulation. Nowparticular formulation of it, some of which being provided by Baudrillard himself, all of this deconstruction is certainly justified, the dichotomy is based on faulty foundations and metaphysical essentialism, however, simply discarding it without making constructive use of it ignores so much of philosophical discourse. In particular, there is Baudrillard's seductive subversion of the dichotomy through his notion of the fatal strategy which posits we take the side of the object in theory. To understand this confusing position, we must first understand what he is reacting against, a vulgar humanism. This humanism emphasises the human subject as the key pole of this dichotomy, emphasising its utter control and dominance over objects. It posits the agency of humans as subjects in a world composed of objects, in other words, it places humanity above the rest of the world. This creates the traditional scene as Baudrillard calls it, where humans through their agency make rational decisions on how to change the world. To him, an esteemed anti-humanist, this is merely a facade created by political scientists to privilege humanity. Baudrillard is not anti-humanist in the mere sense that he rejects the concept of humanity, though he certainly does see it as being lost in the process of the simulacra, rather rejecting the emphasis of subjectivity in any sense. The scene of politics is a facade, but not one that can be simply challenged by revealing it as a facade. Baudrillard writes:

> "All that capital asks of us is to receive it as rational or to combat it in the name of rationality, to perceive it as moral or to combat it in the name of morality. Because these are the same, which can be thought of in another way: formerly one worked to dissimulate scandal—today one works to conceal that there is none."[23]

This is the third order simulacra, an image to conceal that there is no reality there. If we are to accept this analysis, as the challenging capital by stating the scandal merely reinforces its relations, we must come to conclude that we must either embrace the object or subvert it through being irrational ourselves. Both are the basis of what Baudrillard calls the fatal strategy, to sleep with the enemy and take the side of the object of seduction. He takes this position not necessarily out of some rigorously defined logic, but because he believes it will make theory more interesting, and more seductive. Through this approach, Baudrillard rejects the metaphysicians of old in a way so radical that it challenges the analysis of other

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[23] Baudrillard, Jean. 1981. *Simulacra and Simulation*. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press.

post-structuralists. In *Forget Foucault[24]*, he sets his sights on Foucault and Deleuze, who in their analysis of power and desire respectively are said to reproduce the old capital analysis of the Marxists. The signs can be exchanged, the concepts only come to prominence now that they have died and become hyperreal. This is not to discard the truth value of both analyses but to say they are too perfect, too metaphysical. Desire has no place in the analysis of Foucault because it can be perfectly exchanged for power, there is no sign value. The micropolitics of Deleuze and Guattari, along with the associated resistance to Biopower seen in Foucault's later work, are said to symbolically model the forms they're resisting on a micro level. The anarchic war of institutions, the global civil war that Tiqqun talks of[25] is itself an anarchy modelling the same anarchic flows of the micro. Baudrillard is the greatest critic of those who seek to make some new metaphysics revolutionary, though the fairness of the criticism can be disputed and will be further into this text and within the next part.

Regardless, a crucial aspect of Baudrillard's theory is that the object is by nature seductive. A key basis of this is that he claims the agency of the object, similar to the developments of recent object-oriented ontology and speculative realism. The introduction to *Fatal Strategies* displays his approach quite well

> "In their stead, he seeks to locate a genuine revolution, on a scale or front that we— as the species-centric being par excellence—have not anticipated. Namely, the 'insurrection of the object,' which he describes as 'a silent revolution,' but the only one left now.' The fate of the object is one strategy which, according to this book, has long languished unclaimed in the Lost & Found office of radical ideas; at least until now. And for this reason alone, it is a useful expansion of agency beyond the rather self-serving principles of the human subject. 'Only the subject desires; only the object seduces'"[26]

Just as there is desire as an affirmative force in Deleuze, for Baudrillard this affirmative force is seduction. Now of course the desire of Deleuze is not localised to a constrained subject, in fact a key tenet of schizoanalysis is to create new subjectivities, but it is most certainly personal and subjective. Seduction rather takes the claim of agency away from the subject and gives it to objects, giving it dominance over the various subjectivities, to the extent of denying any sense of intelligible subjectivity separated from seduction. Let us draw from modern object oriented ontology for an example. The traditional, subject oriented, approach towards the object can be seen in the chair. Chairs are objects out there that we directly interact with and manipulate. We exchange them as commodities on a market, it is at the

[24] Baudrillard, Jean, and Sylvère Lotringer. 2007. *Forget Foucault*. Los Angeles, Ca: Semiotext(E) ; Cambridge, Ma.

[25] Tiqqun. 2010. *Introduction to Civil War*. Los Angeles ; Cambridge, Mass. ; London: Semiotexte.

[26] Baudrillard, Jean, and Jim Fleming. 2008. *Fatal Strategies*. Los Angeles, Ca: Semiotext(E) ; Cambridge Mass.

mercy of subjectivity and desire. But if we are to take another example with much prevalence across history, the object of gold for instance, we find it is instead the object that dominates these "subjects." Gold as a motive, or perhaps in its more modern and broad form the accumulation of capital, is one that has fueled the vast majority of wars, of social systems, etc. In its fetishization it seduces individuals into valuing it, its sign given an artificial importance. Now one may protest it is still up to individuals to give into seduction, after all the pursuit of gold for gold's sake is a sacred cause in the Stirnerite sense. In Stirner we find that we can throw off the seduction of the object's cause, instead basing our cause on nothing. But while Stirner's egoism certainly will be useful in any notion of going beyond Baudrillard's fatal strategy, seduction is more widespread than the mere world of causes. Rather the holding of conceptions themselves, in our self theory in the sense of For Ourselves! and McQuinn, is itself based on the seduction of different concepts. Take the previously mentioned Baudrillardian critique of Foucault and Deleuze's affirmative conceptions of power and desire, these in their disappearance become more and more seductive. This disappearance of the concept, the transition through the stages from the real to hyperreal, is the direct root of seduction. As such to investigate how we engage in the fatal strategy and how we might subvert it, we must understand disappearance.

The disappearance of a concept come's with our categorization of the concept, through categorical analysis. In the posthumous work *Why Hasn't Everything Already Disappeared?[27],* Baudrillard makes the observation that by the precise and categorical analysis of an object we become further separated from what we were trying to conceptualise in the first place. At a certain point the concept disappears, so alienated from the signified that we lose the real. The first object of consideration here is the human, which after Foucault has revealed its historicism, Baudrillard shows its disappearance. Both Foucault and Baudrillard, each prominent French Nietzscheans in their own right, proclaim the death of the human as Nietzsche claims the death of god (though it should be noted that Stirner "killed" this pious atheism in Feuerbach before Nietzsche had even proclaimed the death of god,) yet while Foucault sees this death in the mere theoretical sense Baudrillard claims its full disappearance. His observations on the disappearance of the human can be said to be the radicalization of Marcuse's *One Dimensional Man[28]*, the categorization of humanity has led to the death of its cultural existence. But whereas in Marcuse there is still a real of man, in Baudrillard we have lost humanity itself in the seduction of humanity. Through the conceptualization of power, desire, sexuality, etc we lose the real of the given notion.

Where the divergence begins between Baudrillard and the rest of the post-68 generation is in the concept of the simulacra. Baudrillard applies the semiotics of Derrida

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[27] Baudrillard, Jean. 2009. *Why Hasn't Everything Already Disappeared?* London: Seagull Books.
[28] Marcuse, Herbert. 1964. *One Dimensional Man : The Ideology of Industrial Society.* London: Sphere Books.

and Lacan to the cultural object, declaiming in the same vein as "nothing is outside the text" that nothing is outside hyperreality. In the text and the symbolic it is claimed we have lost the real, that we are forever alienated from grasping it. In hyperreality the real is lost within the movement of the simulacra, where even the most radical gestures are already conceived as copies of copies. They are never experienced outside of the context of the image of experience. Whereas Deleuze can dream of an outside, Baudrillard recognizes that in the process of creating an image of the outside we become trapped within the very thing we seek to escape. This is perhaps why Deleuze and Agamben recognize we can only conceive of an outside as a singularity[29], it cannot be conceptualised. This view also puts Baudrillard at odds with the movement he was once associated with, the situationists. To the situationists the spectacle is the ultimate development of superstructure, where a sum of connected images and media mediate real connection and any proper view of the base.[30] But to Baudrillard the base has disappeared, the concepts of both capital and subjectivity becoming indistinguishable from the seduction of their image. To Foucault and Deleuze, this means that their selected base—power, desire, or otherwise—is both perfectly exchangeable with capital and just as outdated. For Baudrillard we need something new, something radical.

From this more culturally nihilistic approach, Baudrillard proposes the fatal strategy in its totality. The fatal strategy is an approach towards theory that aims to create more seductive theory, it takes the side of the object. Instead of seeking to subvert seduction, though there is an object oriented subversion in his conception of reversibility, he seeks to amplify it. This strategy is a key influence towards the modern analysis and praxis, or rather anti-praxis, of accelerationism. Accelerationism is less of an ideology and more of a system of analysis, one pioneered by Land and the CCRU. While some posit acceleration as a liberatory process or at least one with the potential of liberatory futures, Land in his analysis is far more fatal. He recognizes no escape, and while for a time he held the sensibilities of a leftist that soon faded away with his new alignment with the neoreactionary current. This accelerationism in both its fatalism and sleeping with the enemy, taking capital's side, must be countered with a resistance to Baudrillard himself. His approach must become the crucial area of contention for any liberatory project. For if a project cannot contend with Baudrillard's critique it will only contribute to our current state of over-bloated scene of nothing philosophies.

Many upon reading this approach may be inspired, tired of philosophies that present a potential liberatory outside. This is what Baudrillard intends, he views the fatal strategy as the only revolutionary potential left, all others seduced by conceptions that have disappeared.

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[29] Agamben, Giorgio, and Michael Hardt. 2013. *The Coming Community*. Minneapolis ; London University Of Minnesota Press.
[30] Debord, Guy. 1967. *Society of the Spectacle*. Detroit, Michigan: Black & Red.

Yet for many others there may be a sense of disappointment, a sense of being trapped within our cultural totality. If we are to theorise in good faith, we cannot put our hope back into a humanism or any revolutionary perspective of old. Rather as Baudrillard proposes the insurrection of the object we must propose an insurrection against the duality itself. We must realise the real of subjectivity and affirmation. This is not to affirm subjects, or any conceptual base of subjectivity, but to engage in a self affirmation that refuses to be subjectified in a Foucauldian sense. We can claim a real of subjectivity because we are immanent to our own being before any observation of the social. What we are becomes more and more obscured, incorporated into increasingly intensive conceptual systems, yet the real experience, of the gesture that doesn't conceptualise itself as gesture, remains. However we cannot conceptualise subjectivity, it must not become a new conceptual base to an ever-growing superstructure. As we pointed out briefly earlier, we can see from Stirner that it is up to us to be seduced in the first place. It is out of our individual creation and affirmation that we become seduced. We require affirmative defiance, a defiance that refuses to recognize the current state of things, refuses to play within its preexisting structures. The issue of desire and power is that they become conceptual bases to philosophical systematics of the social, no matter how historical or immanent they claim to be. To recover them, or at least their theoretical uses, we must localise affirmation to subjectivity, where we can then engage in insurrectionary affirmation. Baudrillard certainly shows the simulacrum of the social, but by locating resistance in the terrain of the subjective a way out becomes clear.

2. Against the Fatal Strategy

Baudrillard in his texts posits the death of the social as a totalizing form that we can describe as a scene, with perfectly defined characters and movements. This is for two reasons, the death of forms due to their over-categorization and the overall death of the real. The social is the scene of all interactions between subjects, it is the totalizing discourse that many in the post-structuralist milieu become trapped in as their theories become lost in a web of ever-exchangeable systems. Yet, to Baudrillard, this scene only exists in an attempt to hide the obscene and irrational reality that lies beneath. It is a third-order simulacrum, an image or form that hides the absence of such forms. More broadly, this movement from the real to the simulacra describes the phenomenon of hyperreality, which reveals the entirety of the traditional social scene as obscene. Baudrillard does not deny that there are social interactions between people, but he does show that we cannot posit a reality that codifies how those interactions take place. If we are to use more Foucauldian terminology we could state that the positing of the social, with its readily defined subjects and potentialities, is a subjectification. This presents a problem to those who seek to use potentially liberatory forces, such as the desire of Deleuze and the power Foucault, as these forms are fundamentally tied to a prior conception of the social. Now Foucault, despite Deleuze posits desire as the basis of the libidinal economy, an economy prior and more fundamental to the political economy of Marx. His broad descriptions of desire across the social through his schizoanalysis of the family, the state, capital, etc all posit a seemingly perfect explanation for every movement of desire. The same goes for Foucault, who in his definition of power posits it as a social form. This is found in his work *The History of Sexuality: Volume One* where he states:

> "Power is not an institution, and not a structure; neither is it a certain strength we are endowed with; it is the name that one attributes to a complex strategic situation in a particular society."[31]

Power in Foucault, while certainly resulting from the realm of the personal, is a conceptual system theorised through genealogy. Foucault's project is to describe various outliers within the social through genealogy, speaking on madness, punishment, sexuality, etc. Each thinker also posits their form as a potential liberatory one. Deleuze states we can deterritorialize out of the various micro-fascisms we find regulating desire. Foucault gives various resistances to the dominant form of power he observes in the world, biopower. These forms of resistance would go on to inform both the thinkers associated with Tiqqun and the post-anarchism of Newman. If these forms are located in the social, how can we posit any liberatory prospect? As was previously outlined, an insurrectionary subjectivity must be posited to resist

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[31] Foucault, Michel. 1976. *The History of Sexuality.* Vol. 1. New York: Pantheon Books.

Baudrillard's insurrection of the object. In short, we must go directly against the fatal strategy. To do this this insurrectionary subjectivity must be outlined, which will use the egoistic philosophy of Stirner to posit a subjectivity without basis. Along with this, these various liberatory potentials towards affirmation must be located within this subjectivity. Our goal is not to reconstruct a localised theory of desire and power, as that would be just to make a new dominant form rule the subjective, but instead to use the liberatory potential each form gives within a new context. Concerning the theories themselves and how they describe the social, their usefulness cannot be denied. What must be done with both of the analyses is to position themselves outside the totalized and lost social, instead repurposed to describe the subjective. This is not to fall into the same trap that Baudrillard in *Why Hasn't Everything Already Disappeared?*[32] describes. Rather power and desire must be used in the way Deleuze wished for philosophy to be done, with concepts used as tools that are used rather than the basis of metaphysical truth.

To engage in either project, the construction of liberatory potential in the wake of Baudrillard's critique and the use of Foucault and Deleuze's analysis in the subjective context, our vision of subjectivity must first be defined. To do this is to do what Baudrillard did to Foucault in *Forget Foucault*[33], to out-Nietzsche Baudrillard. To do this involves perhaps even going beyond Nietzsche and instead turning to Stirner. Now this is not to say our goal of an insurrectionary subjectivity cannot be achieved by other thinkers, including some readings of Nietzsche himself, but Stirner goes perhaps the farthest and is the easiest to use. Now to posit this subjectivity is not to posit a subject, after all, Stirner, Levinas, Foucault, Deleuze, etc already reveal how the subject has been constructed. The subject is not a priori but rather comes from various processes both internal and external. Along with this, Baudrillard shows that by constructing these subjects we create the equivalent of humanism whenever we take their side. Our goal is not some Feuerbachian humanism, a simple reaction against the fatal strategy to turn back to naive fetishization, but rather to subvert this paradigm altogether. This is to construct an anti-humanist notion of subjectivity, one fit for the insurrectionary potential we are seeking. Subjectivity is also not a concept in the typical sense here, as to posit a conceptualised vision of subjectivity would be just to create a new pole that falls to the same attack Baudrillard does towards the traditional subject. Rather our notion of subjectivity is a placeholder, a placeholder for the ultimately indescribable nature of subjectivity. While a placeholder, this is not a thing in itself or noumena in the Kantian sense, as that would be to place a transcendent subjectivity above us. No, this is not a placeholder for something placed above us, but for a basis that grounds us, that we are immanent towards. Just as all concepts are ultimately floating in the sense that they can never be

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[32] Baudrillard, Jean. 2009. *Why Hasn't Everything Already Disappeared?* London: Seagull Books.
[33] Baudrillard, Jean, and Sylvere Lotringer. 2007. *Forget Foucault*. Los Angeles, Ca: Semiotext(E) ; Cambridge, Ma.

perfectly assigned to a signified, a notion of subjectivity that tries to establish limits or boundaries ultimately boxes and restricts subjectivity. The most radical philosophy we can have towards subjectivity is to not have a philosophy at all, to assert a lack of definitive assertion. Lack in this case allows a freedom of assertion for subjectivity; it gives the possibility of liberatory potentials.

This subjectivity is best stated by Stirner through his notion of the unique and the creative nothing, the supposed end of philosophy. If we are to take philosophy as the creation of conceptions, as Deleuze and Guattari do[34], our approach to subjectivity must be anti-philosophical. Baudrillard has already revealed the seduction of concepts, which leads to the victory of the object and the fatal strategy, thus we must focus on the pre-conceptual. Before we conceptualise subjectivity into a Freudian ego, done both through Foucault's subjectification and through individual creation, there is a non conceptual nothingness. This is not a nothingness in the sense of a non-being, but a creative nothingness. The creative nothing is the nothing from which we create everything, from which we conceptualise and stratify our world. Subjectivity here becomes a totality of all experience, as ultimately all experience and all creation is in the context of subjectivity. Creative nothingness is the most radical of anti-essentialism, as it posits that at the basis of subjectivity there is no foundation, nothing we can grasp upon to ground our approach. If we are unable to posit a conception on the basis of subjectivity, it cannot be posited as a conception or object at all. With this lack of basis, the claim that objects can have some proper foundation also becomes faulty. Stirner comes to explain this through his notion of the unique. The unique is the idea that names don't name their signified, they are the equivalent of placeholders for the fundamentally indescribable. To be clear, this is not a repositioning of the Kantian thing in itself or noumena, which states that this indescribability is something transcendent to human knowledge. Rather the unique is simply something that a signified cannot be placed upon without reducing it, it posits every signifier as floating. What the unique subjectivity describes could be said to be immanent to subjectivity, in contrast to Kantian transcendence, but that would be to reduce it all the same. Stirner shows what he means by the unique here:

> "Stirner names the unique and says at the same time that "Names don't name it." He utters a name when he names the unique, and adds that the unique is only a name. So he thinks something other than what he says, just as, for example, when someone calls you Ludwig, he isn't thinking of a generic Ludwig, but of you, for whom he has no word."[35]

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[34] Deleuze, Gilles, and Félix Guattari. 1996. *What Is Philosophy?* Columbia University Press.
[35] Stirner, Max. 2012. *Stirner's Critics.* C. A. L. Press.

When Stirner talks of the unique individual, in this case Feuerbach for whom he is responding to, he names it but at the same time posits that names don't name it. This is the crux of the unique, an object when posited as an object always reduces what the object is attempting to describe. Any attempt at a philosophy of individuality that posits an objective subject will always get caught in this problem and will fall to the fatal strategy. Now of course the subject is not the only thing within the unique's range of application, the assassin of philosophy sets its sights on all objects. This is due to universal application of subjectivity, as the creative nothing in its creation produces the stratification of objects within our subjective experience. It does not matter if we are subjectified, or if much of our categorizations come from facticity, as ultimately applying these preexisting categories is an act of creation in itself. Stirner writes:

> "What Stirner says is a word, a thought, a concept; what he means is neither a word, nor a thought, nor a concept. What he says is not the meaning, and what he means cannot be said."[36]

When the philosopher, in this case Stirner, creates a work of philosophy, they work in concepts. But what they mean is not a concept, the concept always reduces subjective expression. One creates concepts as philosophical weapons, just as we are doing now, but their actual danger comes from the subjective attacks they represent. All objects are thus in essence floating, which means that their seduction can be displaced through the non-conceptual subjectivity they are always within the context of. Stirner extends an ethic from these anti-foundationalist notions, that of egoism. This ethics crucially is not a morality, but rather a path forward towards action without a foundation. To be an egoist is to base one's cause on nothing, to not be beholden to idols and sacred causes. It is not narcissistic egotism, which posits an artificial ego as above all others, but rather subverts the idea of a fundamental ego at all.

From our vision of subjectivity we can recover the theories of Deleuze and Foucault from the disappearance of the social. Deleuze in his philosophy, along with Guattari in this case, created the conception of schizoanalysis which defined itself through its attempt to de-oedipalize and observe the general trends of desiring production across society. This approach set out to create a materialist psychology, one grounded on an analysis of the libidinal economy that subverts the systems of Marxism and psychoanalysis. Schizoanalysis, as the name implies, works through the idea of the schizophrenic and its desiring production. Unlike Lacan and Jameson, who posit schizophrenia as a tendency within capitalism that displaces identity, Deleuze and Guattari view schizophrenia as the limit of the social[37].

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[36] Ibid.

[37] Deleuze, Gilles, and Félix Guattari. 2009. *Anti-Oedipus : Capitalism and Schizophrenia*. New York: Penguin Books.

Baudrillard has two main critiques of this approach, that it is both too perfect and that it posits a wider force that has already disappeared. To start with the latter, as to answer the former we have to answer the latter, Deleuze and Guattari outline a very idiosyncratic notion of desire and the social. They are in no way humanists, or theorists that posit a standard view of the subject. Thus Baudrillard has no real way to give a critique of their social as a scene of norms, as Deleuze and Guattari can be seen just as Baudrillard as philosophers of obscenity. What is more obscene than the schizophrenic or its power wielded in schizoanalysis? Yet where Baudrillard takes issue is when they posit desire as a totalizing social phenomena and even moreso when desire is posited as a potential liberatory force. Desire is the new explanation for everything, just as economic forces were to Marx. Baudrillard claims that schizoanalysis' account of desire in its perfection and totalization is symbolically equivalent with both the theories of Foucault and Marx, thus remaining stuck in metaphysics and ultimately not providing any innovation. Now while this goes too far in many respects, Deleuze and Guattari's work is after all one of the most innovative philosophies, it does correctly critique some of Deleuze and Guattari's systematic tendencies. Just as the traditional scene of the social in liberalism, with its rational actors and concept of freedom, posits a transformative actor in the humanist subject, schizoanalysis posits desire as a main transformative actor. While its analysis is far more advanced and in depth, it still acts as something to be subverted by Baudrillard's fatal strategy.

Within Deleuze's wider philosophy, outside of his creation of schizoanalysis with Guattari, we find the problem of systematisation and universalization appearing. The plane of immanence for instance, despite Deleuze and Guattari's best efforts to posit it as preconceptual, is itself a conception placed as a basis. Now this conception does not have the same issue as Spinoza's universal substance, as immanence is declared to be immanent to itself. There is no necessary transcendent substance to be declared to be immanent, rather it is an absolute immanence. Immanence is not of concern here, as we can pose that subjectivity requires immanence as any transcendent notion of subjectivity creates a transcendent subject of some form. This is the issue with most phenomenology, as it posits a transcendent notion of subjectivity through the transcendent subject. Deleuze and Guattari rightfully observe that all transcendence can be reduced to immanence, immanence must always be prior to transcendence, yet what is of concern is the conceptualization of immanence through the plane of immanence. A similar issue occurs back within schizoanalysis with the body without organs. Within the work of Deleuze and Guattari concepts often mirror each other in function. The body without organs is the symbolic equivalent of the plane of immanence, the former being the basis of desire and the latter being the basis of philosophy. With both occurrences the solution to reposition these theories from Baudrillard's criticisms, though it should be clear at this point that Baudrillard's

critique does not hold the weight it seemingly has, is to position it within our notion of subjectivity.

These affirmative forces of desire and concept creation, both described through the conception of the machine, can be described not as affirmations of a preconceived social but instead as the affirmative potential of subjectivity. This tendency can already be seen within the works of Deleuze, most crucially *Anti-Oedipus*. Deleuze and Guattari write:

> "Nothing here is representative; rather, it is all life and lived experience: the actual, lived emotion of having breasts does not resemble breasts, it does not represent them, any more than a predestined zone in the egg resembles the organ that it is going to be stimulated to produce within itself. Nothing but bands of intensity, potentials, thresholds, and gradients."[38]

This lived experience is where we are grounding our overcoming of the fatal strategy, as this lived experience is crucially before the conceptualization of said experience. If we are to place desire in this context we can properly claim it as revolutionary, or more accurately insurrectionary, once again. Desiring production is not necessarily transformative, but ours is if we make it so. This insurrectionary basis within everyday life can of course be observed in Stirner, but also within the works of Vaneigem. His work *The Revolution of Everyday Life* is crucial for any understanding of this idea.[39] Vaneigem perhaps has the most adept understanding of insurrectionary gestures, of pure life and what it means to construct situations. All other formulations are either caught up in a systemization of what the situation is (Debord), or are obscured by the failure of 68. In Vaneigem there is the simplest but most radical approach available: to live and to refuse. Also of use is Culp's idea of a Dark Deleuze, which tries to get the same insurrectionary potentials out of Deleuze's work in opposition to numerous normalising interpretations[40]. Here he rejects the primacy of the rhizome, which obscures any possibility of escaping cybernetic discourse.

Foucault experiences a similar issue to Deleuze when faced with Baudrillard's criticisms. Famously Foucault refused to reply to *Forget Foucault*, though it can be assumed that he did not take it kindly or merely dismissed it. Power and desire to Baudrillard have both disappeared along with the social. Both are exchangeable, hence why each author doesn't touch on the object of the other. Foucault saw no real relevance to the notion of desire, viewing it as overly metaphysical in relation to the historical form of power. Deleuze, while discussing power, always sees it in the manner of captured desire. His notions of the control society and the apparatus of capture follow this tendency. There is no room for

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[38] Deleuze, Gilles, and Félix Guattari. 2009. *Anti-Oedipus : Capitalism and Schizophrenia*. New York: Penguin Books.
[39] Vaneigem Raoul. 1967. *The Revolution of Everyday Life*. London (85 Regent's Park Rd, Nw1 8Xa): Action Books.
[40] Culp, Andrew. 2016. *Dark Deleuze*. U of Minnesota Press.

desire in Foucault because its place is already taken by power. Power is a social form, it is a specific phenomenon within society. It, like desire, ultimately creates the equivalent of a universalizing subject within the social. The perfection of power becomes its downfall to Baudrillard. However much like Deleuze, we can observe a tendency towards our subversive subjectivity. This can be seen in Foucault's conception of biopower. Unlike Deleuze this is not posited as a potential revolutionary force, it is still very much a social phenomena that can be resisted. However it is specifically positioned within this lived subjectivity, analysing how power creates willing subjects through the processes of subjectification and normalisation. The everyday is made the subject of analysis as it is analysed how power influences these decisions. A crucial aspect of this is the concept of self regulation, which Foucault famously explains through the idea of the panopticon. The current social systems we find ourselves within increasingly operate not through punishment, but through the idea of surveillance. We now regulate ourselves, just like the prisoner of the panopticon, unaware if we are watched or not watched. This positioning of power on the subjective level allows for subjective resistances to power, which Foucault was beginning to outline towards the end of his life. These potential strategies have been used by the theorists of post-anarchism, most importantly Newman. Now Baudrillard cannot be blamed for this as all he had at his disposal was *Madness and Civilization*[41] and the first volume of *The History of Sexuality*[42], both of which present a far more systematic and "archeological" approach. Foucault's work changed significantly throughout his life, refuting many of Baudrillard's initial criticisms. Biopower, despite the death of the social, can still be used as a very useful tool within our analysis because it is not presented metaphysically. However it can never represent a totality, it is always porous. What must be done from here, much like with Deleuze, is to expand on these struggles against biopower.

As was previously noted, Newman's post-anarchism is a very useful tool for the insurrectionary potential we are seeking. This is of course deeply informed by Stirner, positioning it within the approach we are seeking to find. Newman in his work *From Bakunin to Lacan* analyses the place of power in post-structuralist mileu, crucially how these theorists struggled to find points of resistance[43]. In this book he makes a critique, similar to that of Baudrillard, of Deleuze and Foucault. However this was crucially from a subjective position. Through Lacan's notion of the real, which he breaks from its supposed disappearance through language, he finds what he calls an outside. This outside is no supposed physical outside, such as the Walden of Thoreau or the communes of *Call*[44], but is instead immanent

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[41] Foucault, Michel. 1961. *Madness and Civilization: A History of Insanity in the Age of Reason*. London: Routledge.

[42] Foucault, Michel. 1976. *The History of Sexuality*. Vol. 1. New York: Pantheon Books.

[43] Newman, Saul. 2001. *From Bakunin to Lacan : Anti-Authoritarianism and the Dislocation of Power*. Lanham, Md.: Lexington Books.

[44] Anonymous. 2004. *Call*

to us at all times. Culp also makes very important contributions here with his essay "Insurrectionary Foucault"[45] in which he draws upon Tiqqun to characterise Foucault's work as a genealogy of insurrection. Much like how Deleuze has been standardised and robbed of all radical potential by many theorists, Foucault has become a watered down neoliberal through the dismissal of his discourse on rebellion and ethics. Both present a vision of the outside distanced from the discourse of various right and left accelerationisms, which remain in the shadow of Baudrillard's fatal strategy. Instead it provides a new ground for connection, affirmation, and overcoming.

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[45] Culp, Andrew. 2010. *Insurrectionary Foucault*

4. Cyber Illusion and Fake Interconnectedness

1. The General Course

Since the early 2000's the internet seemed to rise in relevance to unprecedented and revolutionary   levels, at the pace that the technology and the bureaucratic systems that support that ideology advanced in the western world it became unquestionable in most minds that the internet would become the new age's premier system of communication. With the "information age" firmly established as our present stage and the internet becoming accessible to everyone, specially with the advent of smartphones and the slow beginning of integration of real life everyday systems into the web's infrastructure, the internet became nigh inescapable. This process would eventually lead to its peak -When referring to meat-digital coexistence- with the Covid-19 Pandemic, the necessities that it brought and the solutions that the digital world brought forth made so that now real life and the internet were firmly, in all manners economic, social and cultural, locked shoulder to shoulder, the digital world rose from being a mere vassal of the meatspace to a system of information and communication that coexisted in equal relevance. The hikikomori is no longer the only person whose digital presence was bigger or as relevant as their meat presence, now with the interconnectedness between digital presence and meat presence everyone was a part of the great digital space, having themselves -In terms of their meat selves- reflected throughout the digital space which had grown to equal importance.

There is no escaping the digital information space anymore, but that's not the issue, the advantages in infrastructure and bureaucracy, information collecting and human communication brought about by these changes are mostly, if in the right hands, great, with the digitalization of our tools being done only due to efficiency and thus only follows the darwinistic game like every other technology. Rather, the internet's crushing cruelty comes in its capacity for catalysing a character creation process with a potential for alienation that far outpaces any other social system. The manner in which one comes to interact with the internet and the way in which the internet interacts back does not in reality characterise an example of human communication, rather, the social structures and incentives that exists in the internet -these being constructed either by average individual participation of the space and also through market forces- force the individual to forget itself in the identity they have and filters and recharacterizes their expression into character-identities that play into an overall spectacle of entertainment and consumerism that is taken by other internet goers, who also find themselves in that situation of alienation, as the overarching world that they interact with. In essence, the digital space is a space of vague abstraction and spectacle creation that entangles an individual into a process of "acting in a play" for the sake of its abstracted social interactions, which exists solely for the sake of spectacle. What follows from this, specially considering the aforementioned syncretism of meat and digital, is that the

world as well as individual identity is refracted, there does not exist any communication from beyond a screen, and we all are fundamentally enclosed in a cube of screens and fed entertainment while ourselves are mirrored and used for the very same. The Spectacle perfected.

The present world of the internet exists as a contradiction, to reach its present form it followed no plan or intention, rather being the consequence of a confluence of different factors interacting with unprecedented technological advancement, ultimately leading up to the establishment of its current Demiurge in the shape of the multimillionaire social media-entertainment companies and the Panopticon of society itself. An important but often ignored factor in the genesis of the alienating status quo of the internet is how it does not serve the purpose it was originally developed for, which is the simple trade of information for administrative and military purposes. Though it might sound redundant, and obviously the technology of the internet would evolve beyond that eventually and become a tool of the masses this historical factor actually reveals one important aspect: the strict and direct way it was a tool for informational exchange that left little to no space in its design for human immersion into the digital. The early internet was one of emails and eventually one of forums, and a result of this is the depersonalization of it, because you didn't need it, it was not a part of you it was simply "mail", quick mail. You had the human interaction you required already via the human connection you needed to have for it to be useful anyway, and when it came to forums you had to arrive at a passion for whatever the topic was first to then immerse yourself in the discussion those provided, whatever way you look at it the internet was at first an extension of meat human connections.

The first contradiction came as the digital space grew in relevance and reach, making engaging with it and digital interaction a purpose in of itself rather than a means to an end, during this period the human-digital interaction fully flipped, with anonymity and "frontierism" becoming the main characteristics of the internet, no longer just faster email the internet was now a large and open frontier to be explored, civically developed and expanded. In this initial period the concept of "Online presence" emerges as the engagement with that digital space now required an avatar or footprint to carry it out, it was still separated from the meat space and many may not have found themselves immersed in the digital as their own thing, but as the first well known accounts were forged in the forums and people's accounts became its own "object" with presence in multiple different sites and a continuous and non-contradictory presence. This process is what truly set the base and the pillars of the internet as a territory, and as territory it became more engaging, more interactable and more overlapping with the meat world. This primordial space of the internet frontier also set it for another thing, while the people were anonymous and therefore more

concrete social interaction was somewhat discouraged it still permitted deep engagement with artistic and generally creative pursuits, animations, paintings, drawings, games -most of them independent pursuits- and so on became the main focus of the internet, giving it its characteristic as entertainment.

Somewhat after this process, but also eventually alongside it and also limited to mostly less "engaged with the internet" people and thus generally to a wider audience came social media. Social Media was yet another contradiction to the development of the internet, as it broke at least somewhat with the conception of "anonymity", while data farms didn't necessarily exist at this primordial stage they still presented themselves as spaces for social interaction between "face-and-name people" not a media picture with a nickname, moreover it was less about the discussion of particular and predefined interests, as was the case with forums, but the general discussion of the user's personal life. Yet not even today they function that way for the younger generations, while older people use these exactly as they are supposed to in the great majority of cases the social media space is a large melting pot of different uses of this tool. People with avatars and nicknames, real names and real photos, people who share of their life and people who produce entertainment, all of them exist commingling and sometimes even overlapping with each other, the ultimate result of this being a space where entertainment and life-sharing was essentially conjoined into one thing, the "online presence" reached its ultimate form as the constructed object from the online environment, the user's creations and the user itself. And as the internet became ever more prevalent it would be this creation that would take precedence over all else, social medias would become uncontested in traffic and influence in the internet while forums and art-sharing spaces became relegated to certain corners of it, most times still existing only as "vassals" of the greater social media territory.

With the great expansion of the internet came the large companies and the State who began taking the reins of the development of the digital world, the "Internet Frontier" slowly lost its land and position as the wild lands as these greater powers began organising and "civilising" it. There was big money to be made on the internet, and big unrest to be prevented from spreading, and so these two powers came in conjunction to guarantee that the digital world will follow the path of the meat world. The internet became much more formal from then on, contractual obligation, the requirement for monetary return, data farming and all these other characteristics became everyday things online, now every social media was controlled by a large bureaucracy and interests, and as such it had stakes on its revenue, which were its users. Because of that every inch of the internet became organised and controlled, what ads are seen, what content is recommended, what its users do and want, the digital world became gears on gears on gears that spin solely to spin more gears on gears

on gears. The users were product and revenue and therefore had to be herded to not only purchase, but produce what was required for the continuous functioning of the internet and the environment that existed in Social Media was the one perfect for that. Users are easily controllable via suggestions and recommendations, demand created via "grassroots" movements between its users who would be the ones to supply that demand and were ultimately doing so because of the system suggestions and controlled content in these Social Medias. Since the creative endeavour and life-sharing were deeply tied within the online space, the "Online Presence" became everything, and everything was monetizable, meant to grow and be invested, controlled and presented for likes and views, the Online Presence was still a "Person" but one presented entirely as a performance made for gain in the logics of capital, the very act of living became part of the market, became competition and beyond that became quantifiable and controllable.

2. Gnosis

When interfacing with the internet the user is met with an overwhelming tsunami of information, the vast and deep ocean that is open to them in the digital world is unmatched in terms of pure distilled information and range of communication, upon its deep waters one can sink so deeply and far from the sun's light as to not be able to distinguish going deeper and going to the surface. Yet despite the vast oceanic universe of the internet the digital world is hardly the great sea of the frontier navigator, rather, it contains no currents, no artefact destroying pressure, no salty death nor beautiful nature to see. Instead, that vast ocean of information is illusory, artificial, its pressure, temperature and scenario closely manipulated and directed from outside, its environment is pre-selected and the vista that one can glean from it is mediated by a glass wall. Every aspect of the digital is inorganic, artificial and controlled to the utmost degree, this wasn't always the case, as explained previously, however after the integration of the internet into the real world the spectacular extended itself over the entirety of the digital, yet those within it can hardly grasp the extension of reality within.

This is not just the case of it being "pixels on a screen" or "lines of code", to deny the reality in those things is to deny the reality in our own biological processes, rather, the very social and creative aspect of the internet is manufactured and the very ways in which the individual is meant to participate and to "live" the internet are constructed with the explicit purpose to generate entertainment. That's the greater truth in the aquarium allegory, that the fish in it too are also there as artificial decorations in the creative process that generates the aquarium, all those people who exist in the internet, who post, share their life and genuinely are affected by their experiences online are themselves artificial, put there exactly to enhance the scenario of the internet. They are mirrors of the world, scattered reflections of what there is in entirety and yet they are entire things, their own beings with just as complex and complete biological processes and psychological experiences as those outside that spectacular creation. Looking in from outside might give us such a clear view yet it is undeniably also there, looking around, and being looked at from inside.

The "online presence" that most within the reach of the digital world have is also by perspective a "living" being from the sympathetic perspective of those also in the digital world, it is not simply a creation, a mere representation of something imparted on the screen that was agglomerated into a consistent idea of a person via memories and guesses and that exists only as a "painted" image, it is also a "living" image, with imaginary will, experiences and perspectives. This can be perceived by how those interacting with the internet also feel affected by it in the things it tells them and the ways it interacts with them, it generates its

own perspective by how the user interacts with the internet and by how that interaction is perceived. The ultimate product of that conjunction of factors is the online presence which is then the mediator between the user and the digital world, the internet does not actually interact with the user, rather it interacts with its online presence, and it is that online presence that interacts with it back, all the user does is receive those signals given by the internet and performing the actions necessary for that online presence to move to life again and continue the cycle.

But the online presence is also distant from the individual user, as it can only reach in its influence the things that the user chooses for it to reach, so it only exists in that space, it is limited and a product of its walls, with the interaction and perspectives that help create it also coming from those same limitations. Yet the individual user is not, at least not in the same way as their presence, they as human beings are a spring of possibilities whose full reach of understanding and of self-moulding influence is not limited by an individual choice of environment, rather the individual expands unto every environment and every environment expands onto them, creating a new Unique being upon every moment that this trade of property is done. From this difference in nature the Online Presence and Individual are separated in a manner dynamic enough that one can operate in an alien manner to the other, yet not separated enough that one begins where the other ends, in the state generated by this conflict one's pull becomes felt and, in an alienating manner, disconcerting for the other, the Online Presence gains its own suggestive power over the Individual.

It is not "the" Online Presence in the way that this phrasing might suggest that it is only one, rather, while the Online Presence has its territory in which it exists and is a product of, the individual user still can and does expand his interaction with the digital world in other territories as modern life demands it. Yet due to the digital world's nature as being a spectacular performance, those other territories reached by the individual user only create a different Online Presence, much as how in being an actor one must play a different character in each setting. So within the very space of conceptualization of the individual's identity in relation to their presence within the internet it is generated a system of Online Presences who are all contradictory to one another, bickering and antagonising each other due to their conflicting purposes and character, yet all of those Presences are the same thing, the individual user, and at the same time the individual user isn't any of them, because they cannot in their multitudes be defined solely by their limited Online Presence.

The Online Presence is something artificial, it is not solely the individual's projection into any given digital space, but a crafted persona meant to be a character played, to reduce it to a role would be far too reductive to the degree in which the Online Presence has its

personality crafted. It is easy to point to the demiurges that have endeavoured for the creation of this projection, the origin points of influence that mould an Online Presence are four. The first of them is the individual user themselves, which is a necessity for the creation of an Online Presence, the one who places the first blocks in creating the creature and also the hands -at first free but then forced by the Presence itself- who mould the Online Presence into anything that it is, but despite giving it a "seed" of personality the individual user is the one with the least influence as to what that Presence will become.

Second is necessity, the mould and environment upon which the Online Presence will be cast, at the time of the wild internet frontier this one wasn't as felt, it was impactful still but the will of the individual user in presenting as they wish in the frontier was what dominated. Those times are past, now the digital world is paved and housed, it became integrated with the institutions of the meat world and the meat world symbiotically also has become integrated with the internet, those institutions now demand a presence in their own spaces, they control and create spaces, from there the individual user is forced by necessity of also participating in meat society to exist in the digital world and it is that necessity that also moulds the Online Presence into what it needs to be for apt integration.

Third is suggestion, more specifically capitalist and pseudo-social suggestion, the individual user has its choice taken away as to how it will interact with the digital world and therefore the limits of its Online Presence are already either pre-set or manipulated. The power of suggestion takes hold, with advertisement, controlled feeds and recommendations the individual user is led to where the capitalist system needs them to be and with the systems of attention present in every social media the user is incentivized when acting in preferred ways and punished when acting in unpreferred ways. The spectacular nature of the internet is in this segment the most explicit, as the Online Presence is incentivized to exist as a performance that plays for a niche, by playing that performance one is rewarded with attention or material gain, treated no differently from any other performer aside from how it is supposed to actually be sincere.

Lastly there is the social organism itself, though it isn't a social organism of people, it is one of Online Presences. The digital space sees all of those factors above clash and mesh together into these Presences who then clash and mesh together to create themselves, those artificial conditions in which they are born are driven into every other one of them as if a hammer to a statue, and from that process the Online Presence is created, it does not exist fully without that outside perspective, without that hammer. The same way the individual cannot be defined without the society outside to define them the Online Presence cannot

find itself existing and living without first creating an impression and an identity of itself in the perspective of the general social consciousness of Online Presences.

The Digital World is miserable in a manner similar yet distant from the ways in which the meat space is alienating, as in the digital world one isn't simply forced into roles to play but their whole being is shattered and hidden, encased on the foreign constructed shells that are their Online Presence, from there they are sent into one of the most explicit manifestations of life denial as their entire existence in the ever-reaching the digital world is cloaked in artificialness in both "body" and spirit. Alienation at this point becomes so overreaching that the sincereness of the individual becomes a foreign body intruding upon the pre-established order and is shunned and punished. This arrangement of things isn't accidental at the part of those who created it, rather it is the system perfected, a machine-like agglomeration of cogs and wheels who operate perfectly in relation to each other and self-perpetuate without foreign influence, only requiring "fuel" in the form of individual users to continue moving, but fuel is all they are as any individual's will to interact with the digital world is diluted and burned into energy to be used for the continuation of those cogs and wheels.

After all of that, pessimism would remain idiotic. The pain inflicted upon people by this system has already been felt and has already set the spark for rebellion and resistance, and to simply lay your hands down and give up in the face of this seemingly eternal and omnipotent cosmos would be to play exactly as it wishes. Some have sought only to flee and seek refuge from this enemy, reducing their online presence and ingraining themselves in the meat world in an attempt to avoid the harm that the digital world will inflict upon them. This is misguided, it does not make anyone more liberated than a prey is liberated while fleeing its predator, they will still have their behaviour guided and motivated by the internet, and so, they are in its prison all the same, only playing a different part in it. Even beyond that the very reaches of the internet are too deep to avoid, it creeps upon everything and demands itself into you, furthermore avoiding the internet is luddite behaviour, it is still the denial of an important tool for the growth and change of an individual and the betterment of their life. To achieve this potential and to destroy this Demiurge there is no submitting or fleeing.

Rather, a confrontational course must be charted, the weak points in the machine have already been spotted, the God has been shown to bleed, and those enraged and conscious that fight for Deicide are already sitting in the planning room, ready for the operation that shall blow open this coffin of tyranny. And, despite its grandeur, or perhaps because of it, the solution is quite simple, negation and self-affirmation, the alienating characteristics of the internet only exists in the degree that one accepts its rules and its

nature, for the one who rejects that, who instead charts their own path in the digital world that alienation ceases. It is self-assertion that breaks the internet, because it places the individual user first, its Online Presence would still be there and be alien, but with the individual absolute over the systems of the internet there is little opportunity for that Online Presence to assert its influence over it, without that the illusion is dispelled, the individual is laid bare and the internet is once again open as a space for interaction between the individual and its digital contents.

5. Panoptilumpenism

1. The Traditional Conception of the Lumpenproletariat

"Terrible things happen daily of which we are not aware of, hidden under the pretence of normality and coherence of the world you and I are forced to experience. Together, but yet so far away, a digital sea of modern colonisation exists. All that is hidden is understood to exist as oppression, and that oppression is but systematic death once the inevitable misery catches up to the rowdy prosperity of the cybernetical un-friendship orders." - Anonymous

What became projected as a refusal to expand on the different forms which the oppressed populations of the world took, the *Lumpenproletariat,* be it the term or the social category it represents, has never been more than a slur. The *Lumpen* have seen their potential, actions and even existence reduced to a mere splinter of class society under the classical Marxist framework, and even more so under a liberal scope. The liberal status quo seeks to uniform these outliers, to create a non-porous, fully compliant and utterly effective form of governance that does not imply the existence of faults and burdens. This is where "Lumpen erasure" begins, as the social war waged against the proletariat takes on a total and complete aspect when combating the slum residents that plague the minds of our bureaucrats. Meanwhile, Marxist analysis is guilty of simply advocating for their dismissal, as they justify their position as a mere result of their own "decisions"[46]. Marxists, in a vulgar sense, never cared enough to advocate for some docility towards the Lumpenproletariat. What both of these conceptions (Classical Marxist and Liberal / Neoliberal) have in common is simply their will to reduce Lumpen struggle to a mere flaw in capitalism and not a feature[47], forgetting the moments and large periods in which the Lumpenproletariat took action, not as the subject of a movance or drive towards a narrative goal, but more-so as the undisputed net losers of the movements of modern industrial societies. In many senses, most political analysis and thought dismisses any unrest delivered by the Lumpenproletariat, no matter its historical importance.

The construction of a "better world" under a historically progressive stance implies the wiping down of the impurities the Lumpen are constituted of : in order to model an effective mode of governance, the "freedom" and utmost total possibility of action that the Lumpen represent needs to be eradicated. From their economical and geographical flexibility, disturbance drive and a mind outside of the usual moral-psychiatric fallacies, the Lumpenproletariat are a truly liberated political character, as their capacity to disrupt Capital in its processes is complete and unconditional. However, as we can clearly understand as of

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[46] Marx, Karl, and Friedrich Engels. 2018. *The Communist Manifesto*. Strelbytskyy Multimedia Publishing.
[47] Ibid.

nowadays, this possibility never translated into effective political change, in part due to the classical socialist political duo radiating anti-lumpen sentiment from across the Rhine.

Friedrich Engels retains the crown of anti-lumpen sentiment, very early on embarking in hatred towards a group he barely defined in order to assert the position of the proletariat as the unique pawn in their path of the progress of history. Nothing constructive comes from the Lumpenproletariat, and this understanding leads to conceiving them as historically "scum" and "opportunists", friends of reaction and the status quo[48]. No point in engaging in a politics of liberation on the side of the Lumpen if these would overshadow the proletariat in sheer will for destruction. The myth of the Lumpen representing the outdated populations of the early-modern urban development is something that persists nowadays. Mercenaries, crooks and "parasites" are what Engels, and then Marx, meant and explicited by the Lumpen, entities devoid of revolutionary character, outside of the glorious proletariat and most importantly, in opposition to it. For all they could do is "bothe" and add complexities that could harm the streamlined view of the proletariat[49]. The Lumpen were slowly getting recognized as an enemy, as groups of Marxists started to develop mechanisms to distance the proletariat from these lowlifes, whether it be with some kind of distinctive "proletarian culture" or "proletarian ethics". This trend was the death of any reasonable political philosophy focusing on the analysis of the Lumpenproletariat, and stagnated their condition, in terms of public, academic and political perception, to an attitude and activity directly from the XIXth century. The Lumpen were never perceived to have "changed" In patterns, attitudes, politics and even membership in the centuries of industrial evolution.

In many regards, the reductionism that Marx and Engels apply to this strata of the population is clearly tied to the events they analysed ever since 1848 and the many abuses the working population suffered because of this undisclosed exploitative Lumpenproletariat. The vagueness of what they even imply by Lumpen at this stage makes for it to become the quick insult many cement the term as, even when Marx's own conception evolves when the first volumes of Capital arrive. His true, real critique of political economy outside of the punctual social commentary over the conditions of the revolting bodies involving themselves in England, France and other areas of the european theatre, comes with the realisation of a new concept that will be very useful following up : the one of Lumpenization, or understood as the process that turns sectors of a viable population towards a much more precarious, fluid and non-protected existence, basically creating a larger input of Lumpen. Marx understood the unnamed Lumpenization as a result of capital's contradictions, but that

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[48] Engels, Frederick, and Clemens Dutt. 1954. *Dialectics of Nature*. Moscow: Foreign Languages Publ. House.
[49] First International. *First International Correspondence*

would prove to be incomplete once the violence of the 20th century sets in[50].

Efforts from the capitalist systems turned the varied populations of an evolving society into elements of what he saw as being the "exploitative degeneracy" that constituted the element to oppose inside the Lumpen, making it not a desirable process, but more so state policy backed by the wide world of Capitalistic singularity. A scheme so simple in its perpetuation that it gets overlooked and assimilated into the "natural" processes of capital, alongside commodity production and fetichisation. His opposition to the Lumpen is, as commonly described, political. But nonetheless, I see this as coming from a severe lack of will towards a deep understanding of fluid class status and dynamics outside of the proletariat-bourgeois divide, as it would complexify and put in jeopardy the effectiveness of his pro-proletarian narrative. In short, Marxism, as the established framework of analysis and understanding of class society guided by the proletarian socialist meta-narrative, has no room, nor want, to establish a thoughtful consideration of what the Lumpen *really* are, outside of all value and moralistic judgement many still engage with nowadays. The conditions of such a shift and change in the perspective of the Lumpen should be set, first of all, on the basis of a "non-marxist" framework, one that does not establish a subject for revolutionary progression above all other possible material analysis.

Combating the many forms the systematic train of thought Marxism has historically represented comes in the originally Marxist realisation of the end of the "labour movement". The late Paul Mattick essentially considered the labour movement to be "dead" and non-existent in the modern times of the postwar world. No longer could the forms of organisation of the working class combat capitalism the same way it once used to. No longer can the proletariat unite under the thought of Marx or Lenin in order to advance the progression of social systems. No longer could liberation be achieved by the same old conceptions of revolution we had carried around essentially since the early Fourrieriusts. As he would put it,

> "The labour movement preceded Marxian theory and provided the actual basis for its development. Marxism became the dominating theory of the socialist movement because it was able convincingly to reveal the exploitative structure of capitalist society and simultaneously to uncover the historical limitations of this particular mode of production."[51]

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[50] Mattick, Paul. *Lumpenproletariat*
[51] Mattick, Paul. 1978. *Marxism: Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow*

On this same basis, Marxism was able to grasp the concept of leading progressive revolution in terms of using a same, concrete and particular subject, one not free but alienated and exploited, with enough potential to set itself free and dissolve the forms that put it there to begin with. But no longer can that be seen as a coherent labour movement, and the flaw comes with this essentialization of The Proletariat, the main pawn to the creation of Marxist analysis.

With this in mind, many properly Marxist groups through the (mostly) contemporary history of class struggle (1960's-80's) have opposed this fallacious class consideration, and taken on a Lumpen defence, one that does confront the previously mentioned un-legitimate attacks from the early socialist revolutionaries. Denning, Fanon and even Marcuse embark in the commonly found "revolutionary potential of the Lumpen", explaining its colonial history as being the "radicals of the radicals", a sort of unmeasured group full of revolutionary fervour, similar to what the classical proletariat can achieve if set under the line of class consciousness. While these defences have served the proliferation of the term in a less commonly conceived pejorative manner, they fall under the baseline that creates the issues of Marx and Engels : they create a new revolutionary subject, this time more radical, not removed from any constructive logic in order to achieve the building up of a concise class identity. It cannot be said that this is truly the liberatory form of the Lumpen. We should in turn, consider this defence as the first kind hearted attempt to remove the monopoly of revolt from the hands of the western and white proletariat in order to atomize it further into greater depth.

Back to the first international and the period of the mere inception of the Lumpen-Prole divide, Bakunin encountered a similar attempt, as the label he was attributed of the "Prince of the Lumpen" was a simple reaction towards what he had conceived as a preferential strategy to out-socialist the marxists. In order to defend the vague peasantry of the remains of economic development in the European labour world, he provocatively took on the position of "Only the Lumpen can liberate and act towards the social revolution". To repeat myself one last time, this is not but a change in the subject of history and a retention of the notion of the progression of history towards a being-just and not a liberatory becoming.

The Lumpen is already a liberated subject, only constrained by its own influenced volition. The repetition of the subject form instead of its abolition and liberation in a general way is nothing brand new or outstanding, and hence the proclaimed Lumpen defence of these authors remains incomplete, inconclusive and truthfully useless for a construction of the real genealogy behind the liberation of Lumpen. Repeating the logical politics of a

state-building governance towards DOTP is unproductive and ineffective in our temporal space.

One group, however, embarked in the tale to liberate and act upon the Lumpen's condition with better basis and wider acceptance on how to approach the subject, this being the Japanese New Left. In reality, this wide movement of social upheaval in the Japanese islands was much more than just a grouping of pro-Lumpen students. From the Trotskyists and Maoists that composed the improvised parties and informal revolutionary groups at the borderlines of the control of the state, many groups sought an avant-garde approach to acting upon the conditions of the Japanese sphere, as well as a takedown of Japanese culture as a whole after the fiasco of the expansion and construction of a cultural identity based on the expansion of the empire. This pre-conceptual imperialist nature to what it meant to be Japanese inherently implied a re-thinking of what groups constituted the internal operations of the Japanese cultural machine, and those that conformed a noumena, capable of taking the more radical stances some of these groups held in respect to some often forgotten aspects of bourgeois society.

The bulbous mass of deformed victims of the violence of the Imperial Japanese construction became the allies of the revolutionary groups : ethnic minorities were, for many groups of denominational variety, the main primary focus on their struggle. Doing so brought them the hatred of some more orthodox Marxist groups, claiming their "non focus on class" as being contrary to the bouillant social climate that might at the time host an actual revolutionary movement. The ethnic minorities that they sought to protect under many circumstances were grouped up vulgarly under the notion of all being *Lumpen*, below the Japanese worker. And under such framing, groups of students in Tokyo and Osaka claimed this aspect proudly, hailing the defence of the Lumpen into action, seeking to organise outside of the prefecture of Osaka proper the members of the Lumpenproletariat, composed of the prostitutes, day labourers and marginalised ethnic groups that were the baseline for economic activity in the area[52]. The so-called "inner colony" of the newly constructed Kamagasaki council, was considered as the "3rd world inside of the 1st world". The notion here implies a heavy dose of colonial relations into the logic of the interaction with the Lumpenproletarian populations. This relation exists because of the following parameter :

> *If the Lumpenproletariat is more alienated than the proletariat, it would cause a sense of*
> *"outsideness", making the Lumpen as fringe actors of capitalist society, becoming exploited*
> *via proximity to class society, but not due to their total integration in it. This logic would*

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[52] Hasegawa, Kenji. 2019. *Student Radicalism and the Formation of Postwar Japan.* Singapore: Springer Singapore.

then perpetuate the sense of outside, and would create a social bubble so alienated it no longer sees itself as being related to their proletarian oppressors.

That last part remains an integral part of the actions of the JNL on the eyes of the Lumpen : the alienation due to the misery and visceral exploitation of the Lumpen from the whole of Capitalist social actors makes them a subject of the "borderlands" of class society, outside, but remaining on the grasp of the exploitation they face. Because of this separation, they cannot perpetuate the Japanese imperial cultural identity that the proletariat proper, willingly or not, did construct. Of all the groups that appeared during this clearly intellectually fertile time in Japanese class struggle, the **East-Asian Anti-Japaneist Armed Front** remains as the biggest and best example of how to envision the lumpen[53].

Many of the Marxist groups, specially those in accord with Eiji Oguma's notion that the Anti-Japaneist movement had a clear "poststructuralist character, understanding its use of pseudo-history as realisation of the "linguistic turn" ", none of them actually continued and carried out the proposed total and radical deconstruction of a Japanese cultural identity itself, basing themselves around the "zenkyoto" form, or joint struggle committees that were used as organs that can be classically found on any other Marxist organisation. On this, the Daidoji couple that founded the front did so in a non-explicitly "opposition" towards the general direction of the *Zengakuren*, that by then had abandoned all sense of radical deconstruction and erasure. The group held on to the stance that became the more Lumpen-friendly out of a movement that already greatly considered this sector. Their direct attacks on the Empire, whether it be via the numerous sabotages like in 1974 or simply the intellectual intention behind their collective writings and most specifically the *Hara Hara Tokei*, had crumbled, as Till Knaudt would say, the entirety of the still not anti-Japaneist enough New Left. Their actions are an expression of the concerns of the victims of this newly appearing virtual-colonialism that is so omnipresent in their conceptions.

Founding an armed struggle group on the collaboration and retaliation of the Lumpen against even the workerist Prole identity seemed too far for the anachronistic Marxists of modern discourse, and even the ones at the time acting as formal opposition to the **EAAJAF**, but in reality, this is the utmost example of an action, an attitude and a thought against the anti-lumpen sentiment, and one favorizing its revolt, self-abolition and proliferation as the vector of the creative destruction they so wanted to see unfold on the Japanese archipelago. The Lumpenproletariat then follows the agitation that it is brought, not prescribed like in the case of the proletariat, and perpetually seeks the total liberation

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[53] Knaudt, Till. 2020. *A Farewell To Class*

that is the lustful object of Communistic projects : a liberation from all sides of class society, an **<u>affirmation of non-exploitation</u>**[54]**.**

Similarly, Deleuze, in his lectures on the State War machine, retook this term and applied a machinic logic to the developments of capitalism he saw in the later part of his life. The "3rd world inside the 1st world" was then the 4th world, represented by an absurd difference between the affluent perfection of the wealth created and then fetichized by the rich populations, and the misery created, not in response, but in consequence of such development. Total misery contrasted to total virtuosity of capital's developments. As such, the 4th world is the situation in which Lumpenization occurs, one in which the machine of Capital, that we will from now on describe as "Technocapital", perpetuates modes of production and exploitation in order to conceive a virtual-colonial situation. This neologism is something I have coined to describe that distance in the treatment of the Lumpenproletariat that was considered a form of colonial relationship by the JNL theorists. This relationship relies on distance and separation, all geographical, social and economical distance from class society, to the Lumpen inhabitants of its borderlands.

Added to this notion, we have the central word of **Panoptilumpenism**, a porte-manteau word encompassing "panopticon" and "Lumpen" to define the effect that is to be understood as the self-biopolitical regulation of the Lumpenproletariat that is on itself the reason of their sense of outsideness and non-liberation, as a direct result from the total alienation they face and the position in society that they held, and still hold, in relation to other groups. Panoptilumpenism, to be more concrete, is the continuation of social violence on the lumpen, but instead of simply constructing an effective governance to get rid of them, would utilise them for a new decentralised economic projection. The conception of the Lumpenproletariat as pure "leeches" or "burdens", as Marx would have them for most of the development of his theory, does nothing but reaffirm, and in a sense justify, the virtual-colonial exploitation of one of the most miserable elements ever conceived by humanity. Sadly, at no point could the JNL's perspective become a majority in any capacity, and even intellectual circles have fallen off with the idea of considering such an avant-garde scene as relevant or possibly interesting for the furthering of class analysis.

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[54] Noys, Benjamin. 2012. *Communization and Its Discontents : Contestation, Critique, and Contemporary Struggles*. New York: Autonomedia ; Edinburgh.

2. Panoptilumpenism and Technocapital

Our modern Technocapital advancements have proven these conceptions of the Lumpenproletariat as an ever expanding entity, one that is really up to date with the tendencies and evolutions of the market and the productive forces subordinated to it. Lumpenization as a process is, inherently, a modern phenomenon. Capitalism devolved into a commodity driven mechanism at the middle of the 20th century, as the ones like Debord denoted[55]. The construction of such a strong spectacular culture towards the commodity itself was only done once the development of the modules of capitalism settled and could bring out a certain "abundance" of said commodities. Via this, there was a certain death of the industrial core of capitalism. Not in its literal sense, capitalism had retained and even amplified its destructive industrial capacities, but because the directive threat of both the liberal art of governing and the Hyperstitional technocapital advancements had been no longer centred on pure industry, it was accompanied by market fluxes and data exploitation. As this, the 80's and the beginning of neoliberal uniformist globalisation ramped up the process of the creation of the service economy, now with the working force of the western first world being driven towards the new disciplinary form of embankment : the cubicle and the office.

Via this, the fragmentation of what was the proletariat began diving directly into the realm of biopower itself: no longer was pure labour alienation the issue for these now obsolete western factory workers, but the war machine of the state and its new labour controlling arms are purposely transforming the scenarios in which these labourers operate, and hence delving them deeper into what can only be considered an entropic mess of an economic transformation[56]. The service economy now tended towards managerial non-tangibility, a notion difficult to grasp for the strictly material based proletarian economic culture, but quite effective for a population so distanced with all kinds of labour, that this seems like an extension of living activities. The welfare state, now that the productivist social democratic compromise had become completely overridden by total business ontology, wanted to turn the lives of these producers into one of total alienation inside the realm of non-existent production and pure data recuperation and management.

The 21st century, via its enormous decentralisation and increased fluidity in the forms that Technocapital seeks to take in the larger and broader scheme of things, began creating a new form of production, inside and at the same time outside of the service economy: the previously mentioned data collecting in favour of the concentrating and newly appearing

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[55] Debord, Guy. 1967. *Society of the Spectacle*. Detroit, Michigan: Black & Red.
[56] Foucault, Michel. 2008. *Society Must Be Defended : Lectures at the Collége de France, 1975-76*. London Penguin.

"Rentier bourgeoisie", as B. Ceka would come to call them. For her, these new uses of data in order to reinforce the structural integrity and reach of technocapital itself are nothing but a new form of labour exploitation, directly via the involvement of this newly imprisoned proletarian force, but also by the Lumpenproletariat, primary subjects of such experimentation. You see, the Lumpenization that takes place by both the death of the industrial 1st world and its impossibility of incorporation into the new service economy is a direct consequence and desired result of the development of new forms of capitalism. Via this, we can encounter the programmed death of the service economy, one in which Panoptilumpenism is applied into its full potential force.

No longer can we suffice for data management, that data must be used, it must be rhizomatically consumed into the new apparatuses of the internet and AI. Seka retains the core parts of the Landian fear of expansion of Technocapital towards Hyperstition and autonomy, and applies it to a deeply Lumpenizing realisation: no longer is any part of the population free from violent forms of both control and exploitation, in the most decentralised forms possible to conceive[57]. Panoptilumpenism took on the totalitarian scope of any control society, but simplified it to data and life-extraction that could exploit as much human capital as possible. The self accommodation of the Lumpen towards this new economy is the greatest controlling violence conceived in modern economic theory. Andrew Culp detested the Rhizome for what it had become, a past realisation of what now is recuperated at the hands of the capitalist directors of the technocapital enterprise. The rhizomatic structure of what Deleuze wanted was now realised, in the entirely worst way possible[58]. The hand of the rising Lumpenproletariat is being forced by the same theorist that could be key to their self-immediate Anarchoscape from the eye of the cybernetic biopower now applied deeply to its own core.

We can conceive of the business ontology that had developed alongside technocapital, has now gained speed and was faced by much less Lumpen-Guided resistance, meaning that it was now more ingrained than ever in our era of cybernetic biopower. This development led to the pursuit of the delegation of economic responsibility, one in which the role of the Panoptilumpenist actions of the neoliberal economy became the forming of the "entrepreneur" in every section of the population, but most concretely inside the Lumpen. The Lumpen, via this new form of virtual-colonial expansion, become their own responsibles for their economic activity, essentially starting what many like to call "the gig economy", but what in reality is nothing but the true decentralisation of the realm of data management and its business-ontological application. The profit motive becomes then the

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[57] Land, Nick. 2019. *Fanged Noumena*.
[58] Culp, Andrew. 2016. *Dark Deleuze*. U of Minnesota Press.

only guideline and prerogative of the Lumpen, one not enforced but suggested to them, not inherently tying them to a fixed and rigid industrial and bureaucratic labour form; but now one that is so flexible that it delves into the total non-existence of the personal life once enjoyed by the common proletariat.

The continuation of the Lumpen as a liberated subject, on the outskirts of the labour productions remains true, as the Lumpenproletariat, with the delegation of economic power and capacities, have become themselves the only actors involved in their newly found subsistence. The common Uber Eats driver, mostly exploited for being commonly of a cultural minority already segregated and pushed in many cases towards Lumpenization, that has found no solution but to collect an infinity of other gig jobs of spontaneous occurrence, of fluid continuation and of tremendous psychological strain becomes the new martyr of our movement, or at the very least it should become so. This one common fighter of the world has turned into a pure state of resistance towards this Panoptilumpenism, a pure form of revolt against what it is, essentially: a brutal regulation of the existence of a group nowadays conforming a majority of the world's population, and sooner than later, will become the active actors in the taking down of Technocapital, in the heroic death that can so descriptively be defined an aesthetic projection towards the imposition of a deep desire towards pure affirmation.

By doing so, the Lumpen should be recognized as one key thing : not a vector of narrative, not an actor of progression, not the subject of the revolutionary, but purely a **concentration of insurrection**. Generally, conceiving the Lumpen as a replacement of the proletariat in Marxist analysis is an error the ones before me have made, and one we have already debunked. In certain senses, here we revert to certain original affirmations done by Engels and Marx, and we do so by recuperating the concepts with pride :

- **The Lumpen do NOT have a class consciousness :** Correct! The lumpen considerably lack the capacity to develop class interest, not due to some classist conceptions of some essentialist incapability, but out of pure interest: Misery cannot be actively mitigated and advanced, and the creation of a progressive narrative towards that is simply not conceivable for the average homeless person, devoid of all possibility towards petty property or even labour stabilisation. Nowadays, even the proletariat lacks a directive line to battle, but the insurrection deep inside the wretched hearts of the Lumpen can be prepared in advance for any confrontation towards the becoming-autonomous process that is so desired.

- **The Lumpen are purely destructive :** Absolutely. This radicality comes from the already mentioned need for unmitigated abolition and not compromise. The ethos of action of the Lumpenproletariat is the affirmation of non-exploitation, and hence, only destruction of the present state of things can actively continue their insurrectionary process.

- **The Lumpen are disconnected with reality :** And that creates the basis of their Nomadhood, a Lumpenomadhood. As their travels through the borderlands of control and self regulation, seeking to avoid or even escape the certain aim and pretended omnipotence of the state, the Lumpen had to become not vectors of the prescribed real, but of their own projection. Life at the bottom of the barrel is harsh, but It can be arranged by actively pursuing a project outside of what is experienced. Not a form of escapism, but a form to arm a population with the possibility of trying to project themselves onto their desires, far away from the biopower that so crushes them perpetually.

- **The Lumpen have no constraints or restrictions to their praxis :** In reality, the Lumpen do not do what is commonly conceived as "praxis". As said previously, the Lumpen do not follow the standards of prescriptive actions and a directive attitude. Instead, as the Invisible Committee would come to conceive popular insurrections, the Lumpen engage purely in a "becoming-autonomous" form, as they seek to out-advance the processes of Panoptilumpenism that restricts their potential Anarchoscape from it. The Lumpen are, in this sense and continuing their definition as liberated subjects, not restricted to a form of actions, as their lives and collective violence against Empire and the leviathan of the cyber control society are unto itself extreme and unravelled expressions of insurrection.

In many areas, the Lumpen-On-Lumpen exploitation has become a primary form of production. Taking the example of my home country of Mexico, the cartels have become by 2023 the 5th largest direct employer in the country, without taking into account the un-official trading partners and oppressed local communities subordinated to their will. They present an interesting case, as Panoptilumpenism is here materialised in the form of a set of previously Lumpen individuals conforming an administrative statist biopolitical entity that transforms these individuals into the role of the common Bourgeoisie. The difference? Well, these elements lack the established uniformity of the bourgeoisie, as well as not being able to be the "official" property owners, as the logic of competition is very well applied to the rivalry between the state and its monopoly on regulation, and the unmitigated commodity production of the cartels.

The main victims here are the indigenous Lumpen populations, people who work completely on the most extreme forms of labour imaginable. Its cartoonish intensity makes it some of the harshest and most direct elements to consider when dealing with the Lumpen in majority conditions. Yes, almost a majority of the Mexican population, both rural and urban, are informal workers lacking any form of security and stability that the statist world would have other societies used to. This makes Mexico a country that, in its horrendous shift towards a neoliberal logic of market advancement and a direct war against what could be 60% of the population, is directed by the Lumpen logic of resistance, but Panoptilumpenism and the biopolitical forms of repression that we encounter so absurdly diversified and atomized nowadays wins over them[59]. As in many other countries, Lumpenization is official policy, and the violence that comes with it constitutes nothing but a will to put down further the subordinated oppressed and alienated groups, is also the logic to its own demise. The inter-connectivity of today's social relations via total cybernetic methods has turned these complex webs of exploitation into a system so heavy of its own weight that these reproductions cannot be sustained for too long.

Nowadays, what it means to be lumped has radically shifted, and its focus and activity too. Yes, we can retain the JNL's vision of the Lumpen baseline consisting of prostitutes, day labourers, ethnic minorities, segregated populations, the workers exploited by the proletariat AND the conjunction of class society as a politico-managerial and eventually, cybernetic entity. But with the new virtual-colonial relationship that has sprouted from the corpse of our service-minded economic engineering, it is hard to not see Panoptilumpenism as nothing more than an extension of the disciplinary control society, a subset of Biopolitical applications, and unto itself, the expression of technocapital's regulatory and directive capacities. Technocapital has grown to extend the uniforming violence of biopower to its economic activity via entrepreneurship, and ends up totalizing the slight imperfection, or at that perfection, of the life of a homeless, jobless or lifeless individual. Panoptilumpenism is a cybernetic socio-economic prison that creates unilateral oppression to indiscriminate groups of unrelenting capacities. The source of the discontent of the many with our current capitalism is rooted in that character of its machinic activity. We cannot really comprehend how truly destructive Panoptilumpenism can end up being for the social fabric of this withering world, but it most certainly will represent itself as the future order of our lives: Panoptilumpenism will most likely not stop at the Lumpen's livelihoods. Concretely, what would be the importance of this analysis? That is a valid and important question I asked myself when the first thoughts on this topic came to my mind, but the answer is clear. Everywhere in the world, this Lumpenizing tendency has created a strata of the population

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[59] Greenberg, James B, Anne Browning-Aiken, William L Alexander, and Thomas Weaver. 2012. *Neoliberalism and Commodity Production in Mexico.* University Press of Colorado.

that is so poor, so oppressed and so unable to act on their own benefit that the concentration of insurrection is strong and pressurised, that the only way for it to come out is the breaking of their shackles, that is now Panoptilumpenism. We have brought immense pain to these people and ignored their processes enough for us to repent and finally act on their model and conception, but without taking them as the subject that can bring our prescribed program to fruition. Instead, the battles of these heroes against technocapital is one that should inspire our new insurrection methods, our new resistance, our new attacks on the state and its institutions.

The fact that we can eventually be so free, even the freedom that is so conditional of the Lumpen would seem like the highest of totalitarianisms, is enough for us to become the Barbarians that at the time toppled the oppression of Roman imperialism, and that today can achieve the total liberation from the logic of the liberal administration and its resulting sentient technocapital. As such, we stand strong, we hold on to each other in passion, the passion to win, the passion to live our lives without the alienation of the Empire, the passion to create more than ever before, and most importantly, the passion to control our own death. At no point can we conceive a liberated society, group or conception as such as long as its participants cannot decide on their death, destroying the little heroism that our era has leftover. As long as we die from the cold of the street and the blaze of the handgun of a cop, our bodies cannot function, our art cannot prosper and our internalised Lumpen will continue to suffer. As long as we die alongside and as the scum of the earth, peace will not reign up above in the sky. And when Technocapital becomes god, and leaves its place in the heavens, nothing will be alright. Kill the Panoptilumpenism that rots your heart. Kill the literal cop that your brain has on itself become.

"Obeying this warning is the only way to avoid increasing casualties." - *Hara Hara Tokei.*[60]

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[60] EAAJAF. 1974. *Hara Hara Tokei*

6. Post-Anarchist Communism

1. The Current Crisis

The final crisis, in its Marxist context, can no longer be conceptualised as a coming event, but rather must be seen as a process we are all immanent toward. We are no longer waiting for the fabled time when the revolution will arrive, where the contradictions of capitalism will lead to its destruction, for it is here. Yet where is the revolution, where is the fabled dictatorship of the proletariat, where is communism? There are riots, there are strikes, there are even small insurrections, yet there has been no end to capital's hegemony over the world. The riots of today are moments of clarity, where individuals disobey and begin to affirm their own future outside of the dominant discourse. Rioters, a crucial segment of the imaginary party as Tiqqun characterises them[61], are not in their current form part of the communist movement as Marx describes it. A riot is merely an expression of anger, but this anger never goes anywhere. The Marxist crisis is no longer recognized as a crisis within a stable system, but instead it is seen as the system itself. Thus to fight the crisis is to reclaim stability, to return to a sense of normality. The crisis has no becoming-event, it can neither be recognized as a break in the system or as a way to overcome the system. We live in the greatest civil war ever conceived, yet cannot recognize our own positions. As such the discourse collapses, and our forms of resistance become trapped and recuperated. There is no affirmative destruction of the institutions of society, there is no overcoming, there is no communization.

The Marxist response has been twofold: there is some false consciousness brought on by some cultural totality such as spectacle, capitalist realism, ideology, etc, or that the crisis is still yet to come. The first response realises correctly that revolution should be here, that the interests of the proletariat should lead to revolution, yet has not. To explain this they posit some cultural force that creates a false consciousness, a replacement or development of Marx's notions of ideology or superstructure. Ideology in Marx explained why the workers didn't turn to the communist movement, positing that the worker does not realise their true interest as a class[62]. Many have correctly realised that this notion, based upon the reductive base and superstructure system in Marx, is insufficient for what is happening here. Realising this, they need a replacement to explain why the revolution is not here, to explain why the workers have not overcome capital. Reich[63] and The Frankfurt School[64] spoke of the desire for repression, derived from Freudian psychoanalysis, to explain why the revolution had not come. To them, the revolution should have come at the end of the First World War, yet it failed, the Spartakus were destroyed and the KPD became Stalinised. This in turn led to the

[61] Tiqqun. 2011. *This Is Not a Program*. Cambridge, Mass ; London: Semiotexte.

[62] Marx, Karl, and Friedrich Engels. (1846) 1995. *The German Ideology*. New York: International Publishers.

[63] Reich, Wilhelm, Mary Higgins, and Chester M Raphael. 2018. *The Mass Psychology of Fascism*. London: Souvenir Press (E & A), Cop.

[64] Adorno, Theodor W, and Max Horkheimer. 1947. *Dialectic of Enlightenment*. London: Verso.

rise of fascism, a rise similar to the recuperated discourse of resistance found today. The crisis of the First World War was supposed to be the straw that broke the camel's back. Lenin wrote that when the colonists had no new markets to acquire they would destroy themselves. Yet that crisis came and went, with the only thing resulting from it being repackaged capitalism in the form of Soviet Russia. Lenin had seen the imperialist war as the final event, yet all attempts to recognize this crisis' finality either failed or was transformed into something unrecognisable. The Situationists spoke of spectacle[65], of the mediation of life by images. This is beyond the mere fetishism of commodities, as Marx describes in the first volume of *Capital*[66], but comes to the point where the superstructure itself becomes a fetishism. All forms of culture become dominated by the commodity form, including gestures traditionally seen as threatening. There is no longer an accumulation of commodities but an accumulation of spectacles. Their methods for the overcoming of capital came to light in the events of May 68' in France. Much like the crises of today the mass insurrectionary potential settled, with the communist party settling for better working conditions. Even so the post-68 theorists were able to recognize this event as an event, one that fundamentally changed the dominant cultural attitude. Fisher speaks of capitalist realism[67], where in Deleuzian terms all desire for post-capitalism has been repressed and repurposed into a desire for repression. The future is quite literally cancelled, the inevitable future of communism has been replaced by the liberal end of history. Fisher is perhaps the best contemporary theorist of our time in this sense, as he recognizes that all radicality is completely absorbed in the dominant discourse. We no longer recognize potentially transformative events as transformative, we can no longer affirm.

Each of these places their choice of a totalizing entity that controls revolutionary desire and then states that it leads to false consciousness. They conclude that there is some set interest, one that is revolutionary, and that the masses have been co-opted into a totalizing cultural apparatus. Yet many after 68' realised correctly that the politics of desire are more complicated than what the Marxists would have one believe. After 68' and the following struggles in Italy, Marxism had in a sense died and those who clung to it were carrying a corpse. The beginning of a post-68' approach to this revolutionary desire began to emerge with the work of Deleuze, Guattari, and Lyotard. These theorists realised correctly that political desire was not purely based on the base of Marx but rather formed a libidinal economy. This libidinal economy was not bound up in the discourse of Freud, but rather presented a radically novel philosophical approach. Deleuze and Guattari in *Anti-Oedipus*[68] showed how repression resulted from the institution of the family, producing the Oedipus

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[65] Debord, Guy. 1967. *Society of the Spectacle*. Detroit, Michigan: Black & Red.
[66] Marx, Karl. 1867. *Capital : Volume One*. New York: International Publishers.
[67] Fisher, Mark. 2009. *Capitalist Realism: Is There No Alternative?* Winchester: Zero Books.
[68] Deleuze, Gilles, and Félix Guattari. 2009. *Anti-Oedipus : Capitalism and Schizophrenia*. New York: Penguin Books.

complex. The pair also demonstrated that ideological desire is regulated via a series of desiring machines, leading to desire being constrained to what capital wishes. Lyotard examines this even further in *Libidinal Economy*[69], demonstrating that workers desire their repression in the workforce. Along with Baudrillard, Lyotard begins to use this approach to deny any possibility of radicality. Thus these thinkers realise that the categories of true and false consciousness are poorly constructed and that there is merely free and repressed consciousness. We may be influenced towards certain paths, to that end, the various conclusions of these new Marxist approaches are in many ways correct, as capital does indeed involve a measure of repressing consciousness, but there is no base and superstructure. There is no ideology in the original Marxist sense. Baudrillard is a key thinker that does this, they explore this sense of alienation and false consciousness without a base of capital relations.

The other Marxist response has been to state that the crisis that will destroy capital has not yet happened. Some point to the third world and state that when the proletarianization is complete the mass crisis will come. Yet crisis is here, we are faced with it every day. The planet is burning, our institutions have become a public laughing stock, and no one is content. We live in an ever expanding state of war, yet we cannot offer any proper critique without becoming caught in an ever expanding web of nothing theories. The Invisible Committee places it best:

> "This world no longer needs explaining, critiquing, denouncing. We live enveloped in a fog of commentaries and commentaries on commentaries, of critiques and critiques of critiques of critiques, of revelations that don't trigger anything, other than revelations about the revelations. And this fog is taking away any purchase we might have on the world. There's nothing to criticise about Donald Trump. As to the worst that can be said about him, he's already absorbed, incorporated it. He embodies it. He displays on a gold chain all the complaints that people have ever lodged against him. He is his own caricature, and he's proud of it."[70]

The world no longer makes sense, the clear cut institutions that leftists have opposed are no longer tactical enemies but have become laughing stocks. Trump is what Baudrillard calls obscene, he is not a break with the system but rather shows what it always has been. How can we properly wage a war when our enemy no longer can be properly seen or defined? The liberals who complain that politics has devolved from a noble affair to chaos do not see what politics always was, the modern scene of politics has both revealed itself for what it always

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[69] Lyotard, Jean-François, and Iain Hamilton Grant. 2015. *Libidinal Economy*. London: Bloomsbury Academic.
[70] The Invisible Committee. 2018. *Now*. MIT Press.

was but also falls further from any authentic rule. Everyone sees it, the crisis is here, no one needs any further reason for a revolt. Yet where is it, where is the insurrectionary overthrowal of the current order? The modern manifestations of the proletarian movement come about in the naive protester or striker, who while expressing rage settles for essentially nothing, and the imaginary party of Tiqqun, who provides a revolutionary subject without basis. Any proper action on the part of the imaginary party must first contend with its own invisibility. Its actions will never be seen as actions, as events, because the war they fight is not even recognized.

Capital has not fallen because it has evolved, it is no longer merely in the form of the circuit of commodities M-C-M' but has evolved beyond its own base. No one denies that the commodity form still is dominant within society, but it has evolved beyond its initial form. While this change should not be totalized into a new idol to fear as many heterodox Marxists have done and many traditional Marxists have done with capital itself, the fact that capital has changed is very apparent. The power that capital excerpts has changed from a force centralised in exchanges to one at a far more fundamental level, creating a cultural apparatus that obscures any escape and pacifies any resistance. As such we as anti-capitalists must change the focus of our strategies from targeting the traditional notion of capital to fighting it in everyday life. Revolutionary struggle, which as the communizers point out merely reproduces the conditions of the proletariat, must transform into insurrectionary struggle. Here we can take from post-anarchism to reformulate an approach, as post-anarchism has transformed anarchism to face the modern forms of power and domination. Communism in the postmodern era must face capital head on, at the level of its domination. We must not seize the state, or any apparatus for that matter, but instead let our wars be waged, to seize our power.

2. The Post-Anarchist Approach to Power

To develop an idea of what the communist movement should take in the twenty-first century, its revolutionary partner in anarchism must also be considered. While the two in their original forms are very different, the theories are converging in the forms of things such as the post-anarchists, communizers, post-leftists, post-situationists, and the like. While it should be made clear that these currents have many differences, they are converging on the general point that the movement to abolish the current state of things must take place on the level of the everyday. This is why, despite the differences between the various currents, it is useful to take from these various currents. The framework and values have much in common. Regardless, anarchism in its modern form has undergone a radical transformation. Just as communism changed after the events of May 68' and its various associated movements, so did anarchism. Anarchism transformed from a theory based on the rejection of unjust hierarchies, a largely moralist and unhelpful notion, to a focus on liberation on the level of the everyday. Bookchin labels this trend in Anarchism as lifestylism[71], a focus on living anarchism rather than actual political change. He is very right that anarchism in its modern form is living anarchy, but this is not a pointless exercise. Anarchy is a way of life in its modern form rather than a vision of the future, it lives the movement of anarchy. Parker places this best in the context of egoist anarchism, which has seen a resurgence due to increased interest in Stirner:

> "Anarchism is not a form of society. It is the cutting edge of individualism, the negative side of an egoist philosophy. The anarchist is not a peddler of schemes of social salvation, but a permanent resister of all attempts to subordinate the uniqueness of the individual to the authority of the collective. The anarchist is someone who refuses to be seduced even by the most glittering or most rational vision of a society in which diverse egoisms have been harnessed into harmonising one with another."[72]

While modern anarchists of this attitude may reject or embrace Stirner, the idea remains much the same. The individual in living anarchy recognizes no master, resisting and asserting oneself. To explore how one reaches the conclusion of this contemporary anarchy and how it may be used in the context of the communist movement the post-structuralist reformulation of power must be explored. Foucault is the key theorist here, who radically changed philosophy's perspective on how power operates. He rejects a theory of power that asserts the primacy of the state, rather finding that power pervades throughout all society.

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[71] Bookchin, Murray. 1995. *Social Anarchism or Lifestyle Anarchism : The Unbridgeable Chasm*. Edinburgh, Scotland ; San Francisco, Ca: Ak Press.
[72] Parker, Sydney. 1981. *My Anarchism*

Throughout his work, he outlines how power operates in different places, always outlining how this power is not simply a restriction by a master but is far more ingrained. To quote Foucault:

> "Power is not an institution, and not a structure; neither is it a certain strength we are endowed with; it is the name that one attributes to a complex strategical situation in a particular society."[73]

Power is no strength, nor an institution, rather it is immanent to all of society. It is far more complex than the Marxists or anarchists would have one believe. In *Discipline and Punish* he gives a genealogy of the ways that society has dealt with prisoners, outlining how society in the modern era has become disciplinary. He famously gives the example of the panopticon, in which prisoners do not know if they are being watched or not and thus always act as if they are being watched. In this case, it does not matter if the prisoners are under threat or not, they are always under the impression that they are and thus will regulate their own behaviour. Foucault extends this principle to all of society, stating that the pressure of society will lead to individuals regulating their own behaviour without any explicit force from society. He writes:

> "The practice of placing individuals under 'observation' is a natural extension of a justice imbued with disciplinary methods and examination procedures. Is it surprising that the cellular prison, with its regular chronologies, forced labour, its authorities of surveillance and registration, its experts in normality, who continue and multiply the functions of the judge, should have become the modern instrument of penalty? Is it surprising that prisons resemble factories, schools, barracks, hospitals, which all resemble prisons?"[74]

This is the main facet of disciplinary society, making individuals regulate themselves without any physical force from the institutions that we find ourselves in. This is power to Foucault, a complex social force regulating possibilities.

To Foucault, power also creates subjects, it creates the conceptual self that we define readily as our identity. This also comes out of knowledge, which Foucault views as complementary to power. Subjects aren't natural phenomena but come about due to power relationships. This idea is explored in all volumes of *The History of Sexuality*[75] and his essay "The Subject and Power"[76]. It is not how we as people have agency, or how we as people act

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[73] Foucault, Michel. 1976. *The History of Sexuality. Vol. 1*. New York: Pantheon Books.
[74] Foucault, Michel. 1975. *Discipline and Punish*. New York: Pantheon Books.
[75] Foucault, Michel. 1976. *The History of Sexuality. Vol. 1*. New York: Pantheon Books.
[76] Foucault, Michel. 1982. *The Subject and Power*

as transcendent or immanent to subjectivity, but rather how we come to have the identity and place we have. This is the same subject that Deleuze and Guattari speak of in their idea of creating subjectivity in their idea of schizoanalysis. This is determined by the relationship of power around oneself, the various pressures placed by those around us, the different things we are born into as possibilities, etc.

Foucault in his later life began to develop a theory of power operated in postmodern society, as society was trending beyond disciplinary society. He explained this through his conception of biopower, which while being a crucial facet of disciplinary power was beginning to be far more pervasive. Biopower is not localised in institutions or even in specific forms of domination like disciplinary society was, but rather is localised in the level of everyday experience. It is a form of power that conceptualises individuals as a species and in turn segments some forms of life as permissive and others as restricted. It can from there control the species, taking advantage of phenomena such as normalisation, medicalization, etc. Of course, power to Foucault was always located on the level of the everyday, the pressure of society throughout life always operate through constructing subjects, but in the case of biopower the forms of domination specifically focus on the everyday. In biopower, every aspect of life is under the influence of power, from the way one dresses to how one constructs oneself. Foucault introduces biopower as such:

> "This year I would like to begin studying something that I have called, somewhat vaguely, bio-power.* By this I mean a number of phenomena that seem to me to be quite significant, namely, the set of mechanisms through which the basic biological features of the human species became the object of a political strategy, of a general strategy of power, or, in other words, how, starting from the eighteenth century, modern western societies took on board the fundamental biological fact that human beings are a species. This is roughly what I have called biopower."[77]

Biopower is the regulation of all aspects of our lives as humans, transitioning from the regulation of individuals within institutions as is found in disciplinary power. This is both a social phenomenon and a direct strategy within our current institutions. Agamben slightly diverges from Foucault by emphasising institutions in his theory of the state as emphasised in his *State of Exception*. The state of exception deems certain segments of behaviour or certain groups of the population as restricted or prohibited and defines life in terms of what Agamben calls bare life. We can no longer live, express, or affirm, instead we must be constantly secure and normalised. Deleuze formulates his own post-disciplinary view of power in the control society. At this time both thinkers were largely inspired by the other and

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[77] Foucault, Michel. 1979. *The Birth of Biopolitics Lectures at the College de France*, 1978-1979. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

converged on a very similar view, expressed by each in their own idiosyncratic language. The control society do Deleuze is where desire is free, yet only in a predefined area of possibilities. He writes:

> "These are the societies of control, which are in the process of replacing the disciplinary societies. "Control" is the name Burroughs proposes as a term for the new monster, one that Foucault recognizes as our immediate future. Paul Virilio also is continually analysing the ultra-rapid forms of free-floating control that replaced the old disciplines operating in the time frame of a closed system. There is no need here to invoke the extraordinary pharmaceutical productions, the molecular engineering, the genetic manipulations, although these are slated to enter into the new process. There is no need to ask which is the toughest or most tolerable regime, for it's within each of them that liberating and enslaving forces confront one another. For example, in the crisis of the hospital as an environment of enclosure, neighbourhood clinics, hospices, and day care could at first express new freedom, but they could participate as well in mechanisms of control that are equal to the harshest of confinements. There is no need to fear or hope, but only to look for new weapons."[78]

Just as Foucault in his notion of biopower concludes that power is a general restriction of behaviour into preconceived boundaries, where we will regulate our own behaviour, the control society serves the same purpose. It is placed in the terms of Deleuze and Guattari's conception of machines, where the free flow of desire in this case is territorialized to a certain area where it will not be harmful. Our divergent desires become caught up in a feedback loop of various machines and apparatuses. For example, we as communists are freely asserting ideas within the apparatus of the internet, where our ideas can be co-opted and become beneficial to capitalism, yet we will not dare to go out there and engage in insurrection. The only way capitalism and all other institutions can come under threat is through an insurrectionary assertion that requires an active resistance to biopower and the associated control society.

The post-anarchists realise this conception of power and formulate resistance against it. This does not include abolishing power, as by this conception of power that would be not to abolish the oppressive institutions but to abolish all means of assertion. Rather to the post-anarchists, there is an assertion, one many characterise as insurrectionary, of resistances towards power. Post-anarchism began with May, who critiqued classical anarchism for its simple and moralist conception of power[79]. Classical anarchism to May holds a conception

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[78] Deleuze, Gilles. 1990. *Postscript on the Society of Control*

[79] May, Todd. 2021. *The Political Philosophy of Poststructuralist Anarchism*. University Park, PA: Penn State University Press.

of power localised in the state and hierarchy, thus with the states and all unjust hierarchies abolished there is an abolition of power. Yet as we have seen in Foucault, Deleuze, Agamben, etc power is a far more complex social force, one that cannot be simply reduced to the idea of the state as a monopoly on power in a certain area. May does not embrace the Marxist conclusion of the state as a dictatorship of some class, as that too simplifies the complex workings of power. The totalizing notion of class within Marxism is reductive in order to define state power, as while there are material differences between classes in the means of production, placing it as a totalizing entity over the state is reductive and misses the complexity of power. Some Marxists like Althusser and the structural Marxists realise this, creating the notion of ideological state apparatuses[80]. From this criticism of both classical anarchist and Marxist notions of state power, May creates a liberatory politics based on the new understanding of power developed by post-structuralist thinkers. This politics is based on a synthesis of the classical anarchist political vision, i.e. the abolition of the state and institutional forms of power, and the post-structuralist understanding of power.

While there are many other post-anarchists, each of which have things to offer in their thought, the one that is most important here is Newman. Newman is a theorist of post-anarchism, his own tendency often being labelled as Lacanian anarchism, that incorporates Stirner's own theories on egoism and insurrection with various post-structuralist and anarchist theorists. What is key to Newman is that he offers a uniquely insurrectionary vision of post-anarchism, deriving his vision of insurrection from Stirner, that posits insurrectionary resistance within power. This is to assert oneself and one's ownness, to resist the authority of other causes and institutions and posit your own way, whatever that may be. He takes from Foucault in his view of power relations who writes:

> "First, it is not a question of having in view, at the end of a project, a society without power relations. It is rather a matter of putting non-power or the non-acceptability of power, not at the end of the enterprise, but rather at the beginning of the work, in the form of a questioning of all the ways in which power is in actual fact accepted. Second, it is not a question of saying all power is bad, but of starting from the point that no power whatsoever is acceptable by right and absolutely and definitely inevitable. You can see therefore that there is certainly some kind of relation between what is roughly called anarchy or anarchism and the methods I employ, but that the differences are equally clear."[81]

Foucault in his later work on biopower takes a standpoint close yet critical to anarchy, stating that no power has any natural justification and should not be considered to be a fact of life.

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[80] Althusser, Louis. (1970) 2014. *On the Reproduction of Capitalism: Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses*. London: Verso.
[81] Foucault, Michel. 1979. *The Birth of Biopolitics Lectures at the College de France*, 1978-1979. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Newman takes this further and posits a politics of actively resisting power through insurrectionary activity. This is not to reject power outright, to seek its utter destruction in a naive utopianism, but to reject legitimising it or respecting it. To always remain vigilant and to always place oneself and ownness above it, not out of egotism or narcissism but out of a Stirnerite egoism. One bases one's cause on nothing. Newman writes:

> "Postanarchist politics always starts from the assumption that no relation of power can be naturalised or taken for granted, that power is never automatically legitimate, that it is, on the contrary, always contingent, uncertain and therefore contestable. We should refuse to see power as being grounded in anything other than its own historical contingency. This divests the power of any claim to universal right, truth or inevitability. As Foucault says when describing his 'anarchaeological' approach, 'there is no universal, immediate, and obvious right that can everywhere and always support any kind of relation of power'. This is not the same as saying that all power is bad; rather it means that no form of power is automatically admissible. This ethico-political standpoint is one that is largely consistent with most forms of anarchism. However, where it differs is in making the non-acceptability of power one's point of departure rather than where one finishes up. In other words, perhaps we need to think of anarchism today not so much as a specific project determined by a certain end goal—a fully liberated, non-alienated society without power relations—but rather as an open and contingent enterprise that takes the non-acceptance of power as its starting point."[82]

This is the post-anarchist approach towards power, the non-acceptance of power as a starting point. Radical politics today, as Newman sees it, should take this approach towards power in order for free affirmation to run free. If we are to take the non-acceptance of power as our starting point we cannot fall into the self-referential discourse that plagues modern politics. We cannot recognize empire as legitimate, just as we cannot deny that our times are a state of war.

What can the communist movement take from this? Just as state power, which as anarchists of some form the post-anarchists see as the main object of study, has changed its forms of dominance, so has capital. The body of capital, in the terms of Deleuze and Guattari, has in its libidinal economy moved towards a society of control, using Foucault's concept of biopower. The form of resistance that the post-anarchists propose must be applied to capital and thus to communism, the true movement to abolish the current state of things. Lifestylists, as Bookchin calls them, tell us to live anarchy; we as communists must

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[82] Newman, Saul. 2011. *Politics of Postanarchism*. Edinburgh University Press.

follow Vaneigem and Tiqqun and propose living communism, living the movement. This idea, in tandem with the form of communism most suited for this insurrectionary resistance, what might be called communization.

3. The Process of Communization

Communism as a movement underwent notable failures throughout the twentieth century, mostly due to the failures of the German Revolution and the rise of Stalinism. With no active revolutionary movement crisis cannot be taken advantage of, crisis turns into mere rage with no end goal. The communist movement had many reactions towards the failures found within Stalinism and the bolshevisation of communism, many being reformist actions that only reinforced capital. There was another reaction, that of the communist left, which reaffirmed the original communist tenets and critiqued deviations as reinforcing capital. This reaction was in line with Marx's original theories and emphasised the need for the real movement to abolish the current state of things. Communist commodity production was theorised by Stalin and even earlier there was the New Economic Policy, capitalist production was not in the process of being abolished but rather was being reinforced and reproduced. It had become clear to many western communists that a new approach was needed outside of the growing Stalinization of the Third International.

The ultra-left reaction was to reaffirm the original communist tenets, emphasising the ultimate abolition of capital and the movement toward communism. This goal was to be achieved through various strategies or programs, the two most prevalent in the ultra-left being the party form and the council form. Italian left communists emphasised the party and the doctrine of organic centralism as developed by Bordiga, which was said to remove the threat of the party becoming a renegade of communism. Bordiga describes it as such:

> "The democratic criterion has been for us so far a material and incidental factor in the construction of our internal organisation and the formulation of our party statutes; it is not an indispensable platform for them. Therefore we will not raise the organisational formula known as "democratic centralism" to the level of a principle. Democracy cannot be a principle for us. Centralism is indisputably one, since the essential characteristics of party organisation must be unity of structure and action. The term centralism is sufficient to express the continuity of party structure in space; in order to introduce the essential idea of continuity in time, the historical continuity of the struggle which, surmounting successive obstacles, always advances towards the same goal, and in order to combine these two essential ideas of unity in the same formula, we would propose that the communist party base its organisation on "organic centralism". While preserving as much of the incidental democratic mechanism that can be used, we will eliminate the use of the term "democracy", which is dear to the worst demagogues but tainted with irony for the exploited, oppressed and cheated, abandoning it to the exclusive usage of the bourgeoisie and the champions of

liberalism in their diverse guises and sometimes extremist poses."[83] (Bordiga, 1922, pg. 38-39).

The party to Bordiga and the rest of the Italian left, was the leader of the communist movement. It allowed the proletariat to rise from a mere class statistically to a real political force. This party was not meant to be above the proletariat, but of the proletariat, being its main expression of political force. Italian left communism provided the most radical and authentically Marxist expression of Leninism, not falling to the opportunism that was so prevalent during his time.

The Dutch-German left emphasised a different form of the dictatorship of the proletariat, expressing proletarian power through the council form. Councils are an expression of the power of the working class as itself, organised into councils of workers that manage the state apparatus. This is not a labour bureaucracy, nor a hierarchy of workers' unions, but the expression of working-class power directly in a dictatorship of the proletariat. Pannekoek describes the state of the workers' councils as such:

> "The Workers' Councils are the form of self-government which in the times to come will replace the forms of government of the old world. Of course not for all future; none such form is for eternity. When life and work in community are natural habits, when mankind entirely controls its own life, necessity gives way to freedom and the strict rules of justice established before dissolve into spontaneous behaviour. Workers' councils are the form of organisation during the transition period in which the working class is fighting for dominance, is destroying capitalism and is organising social production. In order to know their true character it will be expedient to compare them with the existing forms of organisation and government as fixed by custom as self-evident in the minds of the people."[84]

Workers' councils are an expression of power by a cohesive working class, to abolish capital and transition into communism. The workers through the council-form organise production, distribution, and work to destroy the bourgeoisie.

Council communists have very divergent views on the party, with some viewing it as a basis of education for the proletariat and others viewing it as inherently counterrevolutionary. This division created the division of the Dutch-German left into council communists and councilists. Many among the Italian left criticise both factions for having a fundamentally economic form of organisation that cannot express itself in the

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[83] Bordiga, Amadeo. 1922. *The Democratic Principle*

[84] Pannekoek, Anton, and Robert F Barsky. 2003. *Workers' Councils*. Edinburgh, Scotland ; Oakland, Calif.: Ak Press.

political realm. To them, the party represents the only true expression of proletarian force, using the state as its weapon. Bordiga is quite right that the party, if organised under organic centralist lines, is the truest expression of proletarian force in the political realm. Revolutionary spontaneity is a naive position, assuming that a mass movement without actual political organisation behind it can lead to a seizure of political power. The council communists, such as Goter, even admit this themselves, going against councilism by stating that the party is needed for revolutionary action.

Yet the workers' movement that inspired the debates over organisation and revolutionary strategy is dead and has been dead for some time. Its death was announced in the outcome of May 68'. This death was not an immediate one, but a slow burn. The various struggles of the New Left, as well as actions among Italian autonomists and anarchists, showed that anti-capitalist desire remained. Yet this desire only was shown in moments of clarity, of crisis, the workers' movement which had retained this desire among many for so long had died. Both Dauve and Bonanno mourn and celebrate this death, realising it is the end of an era. Dauve in *When Insurrections Die* gives a genealogy of this slow burn, while Bonanno sees it more as an immediate death after 68'. Regardless, the revolutionary potential of the past was dead, yet a new way forward could be seen among many. In the death of Marxism as the dominant narrative behind radical politics an explosion of new ways forward came about. The post-structuralists deconstructed the assumptions behind the philosophy of the past. Figures such as Derrida, following Heidegger's proclamation of the death of metaphysics, deconstructed the various essentialisms found throughout the history of philosophy. Through this radical conclusions on semiotics were reached that could have never been conceptualised within the dominant discourse of Marxism. Others such as Deleuze offered refreshing new paths forward, reversing many of the tenets of metaphysics to create a philosophy of pure immanence. Philosophy had abandoned the Marxist narrative of history, though of course, an honest reader would be hard-pressed to find this dominant narrative in Marx's more technical pieces. Within the political sphere, the death of the workers' movement left radicals searching for new frameworks to ground their desires. While Marxism lay dead, Derrida is quite right that a spectre remained throughout the supposed liberal end of history. The promise of a liberatory future hangs like a ghost above our current situation of self-referential recuperation. Escape, in whatever form it may appear, is seen only through the cracks in an increasingly well constructed illusion. The post-left developed out of a critique of many of the dogma and essentialism found throughout the traditional left, emphasising a politics of insurrectionary individuation. These folk naively abandoned communism, failing to see it as the only viable anti-capitalism. All individuation, the abolition of mediation between individuals motivated by ownness, must lead to communism. As communism is the true movement to abolish the current state of things, it is the movement

to abolish the mediation of capital and its various institutions. It is not a dream that hangs as a heaven above our current lives, but instead something we are immanent towards yet alienated from. Communism, despite the death of the workers' movement, remains the only viable anti-capitalist politics.

If we are to accept this, we must grapple with both the death of the old workers' movement and the transformations that capital has undertaken. As was outlined in the first two parts, capital as a force has transformed into the strict regulation of the everyday. For Tiqqun and their successors, such as The Invisible Committee and Culp, the way in which capital regulates the everyday is explained by two forces. These two forces are biopower, taken from Foucault, and spectacle, taken from Debord. Tiqqun in *Introduction to Civil War* write:

> "But even if Empire could endow itself with a fake institutional facade, its actual reality would still remain concentrated in worldwide police and publicity, or, respectively, Biopower and Spectacle. The fact that the imperial wars present themselves as "international police operations" implemented by "intervention forces," the fact that war itself is put outside the law by a form of domination that wants to pass off its own military offensives as little more than domestic administration, that is, as a police and not a political matter—to ensure "tranquillity, security, and order"—all this Schmitt had already anticipated sixty years ago, and in no way does it contribute to the gradual development of a "right of the police," as Negri would like to believe. The momentary spectacular consensus against this or that "rogue State," this or that "dictator" or "terrorist" only validates the temporary and reversible legitimacy of any imperial intervention that appeals to this consensus."[85]

The forces of capital, in this case placed under the term Empire following Hart and Negri, control in a Deleuzian sense through a regulation of the body seen in biopower and a mediation by false images seen in spectacle. This model is taken up by the majority of Tiqqun's disciples. These two forces, though there have been challenges to both's theoretical legitimacy brought up by figures like Baudrillard, present an image of how capital operates in our contemporary context. This is well in line with the observations brought up in previous parts by Deleuze and Guattari, Lyotard, and Foucault. While we have previously elaborated upon the conception of power, spectacle requires further elaboration. We no longer live in the society of the spectacle as conceptualised by Debord in 1967[86], but we have not exited spectacle as Baudrillard claims. Instead this system of images has pervaded to the base of the

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[85]Tiqqun. 2010. *Introduction to Civil War*. Los Angeles ; Cambridge, Mass. ; London: Semiotexte.
[86] Debord, Guy. 1967. *Society of the Spectacle*. Detroit, Michigan: Black & Red.

base-superstructure paradigm. Capital relations came to dominate our collective senses of images, yet from there the image began to dominate our sense of capital. Capital as a construction becomes one among many concepts we exchange in our cultural scene. We now have an image of capital, in contrast to the body of capital. The question then becomes how do we distinguish spectacle from expression? How do we find an outside?

If we accept this as the modern state of capital, though there are of course critiques mentioned that will be discussed in another text, then we must accept that the horizon of struggles lie on the level of the everyday. This is of course to suggest an insurrectionary struggle, rather than a revolutionary one. Insurrection naturally leads on a wide scale to a revolutionary overthrow of power, communization, but does not create a reproduction of a new power structure. Vaneigem in his magnum opus *The Revolution of Everyday Life* explains everyday struggle as such:

> "Assurance of security leaves unused a large supply of energy formerly expended in the struggle for survival. The will to power tries to recuperate, for the reinforcement of hierarchical slavery, this freefloating energy which could be used for the blossoming of individual life. Universal oppression forces almost everyone to withdraw strategically towards what they feel to be their only uncontaminated possession: their subjectivity. The revolution of everyday life must create practical forms for the countless attacks on the outside world launched daily by subjectivity."[87]

Vaneigem rightfully observes that dominance and oppression are at the level of everyday practices and places subjectivity as a potential outside of Capital. This is clearly correct, a pure unmediated subjectivity presents a clear outside to capital and thus must be the location of new struggles. We must propose, as the situationists did, an expression of pure creativity and playfulness. As Vaneigem once said: "creativity plus a machine gun is an unstoppable combination." Now to be clear, this does not mean that we can realise communism by an alternative lifestyle, a commune, and supposed escapes from Capital. We must be sceptical of any expression of subjectivity grounded upon predefined boundaries. This is the error of Bey in the idea of the temporary autonomous zones, he assumes a readily made outside capital we can simply live in. Dauve in *Eclipse and Reemergence of the Communist Movement* gives a critique of these supposed outsides, he writes:

> "Communism is not an ideal to be realised: it already exists, not as alternative lifestyles, autonomous zones or counter-communities that would grow within this society and ultimately change it into another one, but as an effort, a task to

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[87] Raoul Vaneigem. 1967. *The Revolution of Everyday Life*. London (85 Regent's Park Rd, Nw1 8Xa): Action Books.

prepare for. It is the movement which tries to abolish the conditions of life determined by wage-labour, and it will abolish them only by revolution."[88]

The movement to abolish the current state of things is not to settle, to give up and seek a life in fake outsides, but instead to communize. Communization is the horizon of communism that we find in the twenty first century, the mode of struggle that finds itself operable. The notion of communization is one that has much internal conflict, with different groups and theorists while keeping to similar sensibilities having large disagreement. Our vision of communization follows from the post-anarchist vision of power presented in the previous parts. Communization traditionally presents a vision of an immediacy of communism, meaning that there are no institutional stages. These institutions presented, such as the traditional Marxist conception of the dictatorship of the proletariat, are seen as presenting a workerism. This workerism asserts the proletarian class as a class, rather than a negation of its conditions. Immediatism does not imply communism being immediate, communization is a process not a sudden switch. Kropotkin's conception of the creation of communism follows a similar logic, though sadly many contemporary anarchists do not see this nuance. To escape this workerism a strategy of self exit from the proletariat becomes clear, a strategy presented by Theory Communiste. From this we find communization as a fundamentally insurrectionary process, based on the combined power of separate individual insurrection. Following from Stirner and Newman, we find the basis of our communization. Our communization is the post-anarchist strategy towards power applied to the body of capital, with the rejection of the legitimacy of its power leading to an insurrectionary rejection of its institutions. As The Invisible Committee stated: "Communism is not made through the expansion of new relations of production, but rather in their abolition." Our idea of communization, our post-anarchist communism, is based not in a revolutionary construction of new institutions, but a communist free affirmation following from the destruction of the institutions of capital. The struggle to live an unmediated life is not dead with the death of the workers' movement, it has only begun.

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[88] Dauvé, Gilles, and François Martin. 2015. *Eclipse and Re-Emergence of the Communist Movement*. PM Press.

7. The Acceleration Towards Cuteness (Interview with Maya B. Kronic and Amy Ireland)

1- First of all, as we wanna be polite : How are you ? Everything Ok ? Anything New? Hope everything is alright and fantastic

Maya B. Kronic: At the time of writing, Amy is in Australia so we are reliving the traumatic period of separation during the COVID lockdown, when we were trapped on opposite sides of the planet. That was the time when the initial ideas for *Cute Accelerationism* began to germinate.

Amy Ireland: But this time around, we are not so ungrounded. We have proper, indoor, places to live! And we have an exact date for when we will see each other again, it's not an ongoing mystery, caught between the top-down power of the state and the bottom-up power of the virus.

1.1- Why the Cute ?

MBK: It's something that happened to us, and the encounter provoked us to think. There was a heterogenesis: multiple causes and sources of stimulation collided and were synthesised in order to bring *Cute Accelerationism* into existence

First and foremost, we were taken totally by surprise by realising we had fallen in love. Then we were bewildered by the parallels between this phenomenon and the core dynamics of accelerationism. At the same time, the experience changed us, and fidelity to those changes made it impossible for us to abide by the aesthetic and stylistic orthodoxies that had become calcified around accelerationism—whether the hard-edged, macho rhetoric of right accelerationism, or the bossy administrative tedium of left accelerationism. At this point, it became clear to me that *accelerationisms* were plural, and that ours was the cute one. The notion of 'cute accelerationism' was a joke at first, expressing the bewilderment and delight of that moment—but somewhere deep down we must have known that there was more to it than that.

It was only subsequently that we connected all of this with the question of cuteness as a cultural trend. As we began to look into that, we were confirmed in our intuition that there was something important here in relation to passionate surrender, transformation, the disruption of identity, time, and gender.

So it was only as a secondary repercussion of the initial encounter, which forced us to think, that we began to research the history of Cute and think about its future. The experience of becoming-cute drove the whole thing.

AI: The classic accelerationist 'subject' is not an agent but a patient. Rather than imposing an autonomous will on history, they are swept up by—and can channel—the currents of an outside but immanent force. This is why accelerationists talk about demons. The accelerationist subject is like the subject of a demonic possession. When you're possessed by a demon, you've either let down your guard or your defences have proven ironically to be the medium of its ingression; either way, you've let something in, and suddenly both you and the world end up being transformed.

Cute also works like this. Try, earnestly, to interact with something cute without involuntarily *becoming* cute yourself—whether in speech or action, or by the adoption of new ways of relating to your body, digitally or IRL. It's very difficult to resist. This is the source of cute's enormous viral power, it moves very quickly from objects to subjects, makes subjects into objects, and moves from those objects to new subjects, *ad infinitum*, in an ongoing cyperpositive spiral fuelled by capitalism, the internet, and ancient biological cues everted into extravagant trajectories of mass cultural supernormalisation.

2- Why run towards Deleuze in the face of analysing a modern phenomenon ?

AI: One simple answer is that accelerationism is a philosophy of transcendental time, and all the OG accelerationists—Marx, Nietzsche, Deleuze and Guattari, Land, Plant—are philosophers of transcendental time. ***Cute Accelerationism*** is working in this lineage. If you want, you can trace it all the way back to Kant, who, incidentally, was pretty cute. He invented programming socks as well as transcendental philosophy.

MBK: Yes, the book was written entirely within the framework of a transcendental philosophy inherited from Kant via Deleuze and Guattari and Ccru.

One of the things I learned from Amy is to read Deleuze as an esoteric philosopher—not in the sense that he's secretly referring to occult magical practices (although sometimes he is), but in the sense that beneath the philosophical surface there are secret keys that unlock subterranean passages between different sites in his work. These concepts often aren't ostensibly declared or discursively explicated, but they structure the work at a deeper level. The egg is one of those—you can interpret it as a biological analogy or as an appeal to myth, and in either case you can refuse it as philosophically inadmissible. But if you allow yourself to follow where that concept goes, and understand the work that it's doing in making it possible to pass between various different discourses and figures, it becomes a cipher that gives you access to a whole intricate assemblage.

And then, ultimately, ***Cute Accelerationism*** is a book about becoming and its enemies, and Deleuze provides the philosophical resources that enable us to think becoming philosophically, in particular with Guattari in *Capitalism and Schizophrenia*,

Capitalism and Schizophrenia is very important to us, and in part this is because it provides the most sophisticated reading of the *ambivalence* of capitalism, which in turn allows one to escape the dialectic of condemnation of capitalism and facile celebration of its delights.

Deleuze and Guattari's understanding of intensification, acceleration, and decoding in capitalism is unsurpassed, I would say. I can only speak for myself and say that I feel like my understanding of all this work is still only at an early stage, and there is no reason to think that somehow it's 'been done' or is 'over' or whatever. There's nothing more dumb than taking that kind of attitude toward philosophers, as if they have a sell-by date or can be written off as mere juvenilia. This is the hateful and condescending side of Hegelianism and its moronic conception of the work of time and history. What's specific to philosophy as a discipline is its weird relation to its own history, where there is no superceding, no obsolescence, no proving wrong, but always a continual circulation and manipulation of that history.

Lastly, Although of course I confront certain philosophical problems and have read and appropriated the work of other philosophers, for me the thought of Deleuze constitutes a kind of metadiscourse about what it means to do philosophy at all—namely, his unique theory of Ideas according to which Ideas are not there to be voluntarily, introspectively analysed, but are 'out there' in the form of problems—fields of intensity or tension, the potential object of an encounter which then must be held on to, loved, and sustained (a 'Platonism of problems'). Any work I have done that matters to me has emerged out of encounters with problems that perplex, hurt, stretch, or oppress me and which leak out of any pre-existing theoretical concepts I try to catch them in—and from the subsequent attempt to hold to them, to continue to exert a loving pressure upon them in the hope of being able to construct theoretical models that will unfold them and propagate them to others. ***Cute Accelerationism*** in its entirety was the product of this way of working: we didn't pick out 'philosophically interesting' problems, the problems happened to us, we underwent them as a kind of ordeal, albeit an euphoric one—'passion' is the correct term—but they remained to be constructed in actuality.

AI: Deleuze is a philosopher of transcendental time. He's doing a kind of philosophy that deals with something that is not 'in' time, and since this thing isn't affected by the passing of

time, it would be strange to say that the relevance of philosophising about it is. ***Cute Accelerationism*** is interested in how this thing outside of time is leaving a trail in contemporary culture that happens to be extremely cute. We are trying to think the transcendental temporality of cute: what does it mean to participate in a virtual future that is dehumanising, desubjectivising, and denaturalising us, that is transforming us in the pursuit of ever-cuter configurations in ways that we haven't even begun to comprehend?

MBK: Accelerationism is inseparable from the question of transformation. As soon as you decouple accelerationism in its Landian form from productive temporal paradoxes of the *Terminator* type, it simply collapses either into technocratic planning or resignation to fate. Our approach is to affirm the supposed paradox and lean into the fact that accelerationism is about investing oneself in problems whose further development will retroactively prove to have been the cause of one's investment in them. (Again, the isomorphism with the event of falling in love should be clear). This implies a distinction between mere passivity—the figure of the 'dividual', Gilles Châtelet's 'cybernetic tapeworm' who merely satisfies their instincts, in doing so producing a reliable input and output for capital—and *desire-as-surrender*, which involves a certain investment, positive feedback, and a labour of remaining faithful to the problem, even at the risk of one's prior identity.

There are other philosophical influences in the book. In particular we have mitigated the potentially narcissistic-individualist notion of self-transformation by approaching it through a broadly pragmatist understanding of how real change, and the undermining of prohibitions on 'changing Nature', are socially-mediated, and the role played by collectivities in becomings.

Finally, ***Cute Accelerationism*** is a book that follows a time-honoured tradition of Urbanomic: to conduct that paradoxical and perhaps impossible operation that we call 'pop philosophy'. Is it possible to deploy the most involved, dense philosophical thinking at the same time as transmitting the joyful affect of a real encounter through a writing that is available to non-experts? You don't need to read all the extensive endnotes of ***Cute Accelerationism*** to 'get' the main text. We perform it as an audiovisual 'performance-lecture', which was its original form, in fact. The main text is short but overcharged, because everything we spoke about together over five years has been compressed into it. The notes are a secondary process that we carried out for ourselves, of unpacking and decompressing what we'd done, so as to ask from a philosophical point of view: *What Happened?*

In short, we didn't set out to write a book of philosophy or cultural critique. We were simply trying to describe extraordinary and unexpected things that were happening to us, and which transformed our understanding of ourselves and of the world.
Cute Accelerationism is more like a hyperpop song than a scholarly text.

AI: A song that samples from many diverse (and often unreferenced) sources, not just philosophical ones.

MBK: The large body of notes that accompanies the main text consists of, firstly, documentation of the research that we ended up doing, and secondly, attempts to develop a broader philosophical account of what we're talking about. This inevitably draws upon what we have worked on in the past. But it also reveals the *anastrophic* nature of what we're dealing with here. Falling in love is an event that propagates itself 'backwards' in time. Everything that happened before suddenly makes sense in light of its having led up to that event. Writing the book worked like that too. For instance, the long footnote about Deleuze and eggs includes all kinds of things that we had discussed and worked on previously, but now suddenly they all made sense in relation to Cute.

3- Considering the CCRU's history, would this be appropriate to be called "a successor" to the group's writings or intentions to any degree ?

MBK: From the point of view of cute/acc, obviously everything was leading up to cute/acc. This book samples from Sadie and Nick's work, Ccru lore, and the general spirit of those times, but everything is now played in a different key.

However, I recently looked back at one of the photocopied zines that I was making at Warwick University in the mid-nineties before Ccru even existed, and there's a text I wrote in there with anime girl illustrations talking about transforming the body and 'hormonal entertainment systems'. It all makes sense backwards.

more. Digispace is leaking into your system, destroying the memory banks.
The Schreberian real - liquified by the rupture of the integrating membrane. The screen disappears > Those fleeting homunculi, those talking birds, that God, those miracles. All these are real affects. And that mohicaned hedehog? Is *that* real? *So it's me...?*
The anticipation, the tension, the fulgurating colors glaring from the monitor, the *intensity*....begin to meld together, a ductile tissue of affect develops between hand eye and console. Tunnel-vision, hairtrigger-epilepsy. Distributed across a digi-haptic landscape, no longer individuated but moving as a massive.
In the zone of the schizo-*otaku* humans are search-engines, processing devices for a future that is all-too alien. The body is data.

kSPACE

As global vironet spreads, the game redistributes itself and eats unhealthily. Junk data gathered parasitically from *otaku* recombines into replicator-units.
Second-level phaseswitch activates exponential demand, spiralling

Zero

cultviral hysteria [what is happening to our children? AGES sucked retroductively through cyberoutines {orphanamnesia} auto-obsolesces parental control{generational hierarchy}], pirated neurosoft swamping the markets; economies locked into cyberspace production. Techonomics gets virtual and brings in Nintendo to rewire the stock market. Gluts of autonomous AI modules flood into areas of diuretic yenflux, hotzones of K-contam, trading meat as a fetish commodity. The demand for entertainment is still unsated, new frictions must be

engendered, new experiences created. Entertainment goes hormonal, bacterial, viral, genetic, *give the kids what they want.*

downLOADING

"Downloading, do not interrupt, irreversible biomolecular processes initiated."
A FakeSpaceCorp. reality engine implements itself and drops like a fine grid of filaments into the mind. Running Microsoft VRos 2.2, Variables lock in, probes scan neural nets, the vectors focus, engage...
It begins with an itch, an irritation, you see diagrams form and disform across the screen, the intervals between them become increasingly indiscrete as time itself seems to warp. As you gradually grasp the O/S, your body begins to bubble, growths appear and new organs emerge. You seem to be developing into something like a skin or a wet-wear VR suit, but far more complex, far more biological. The screen, and with it your aesthetic of space begins to melt. Suddenly you begin to feel good, you feel like you're going on holiday and wont be coming back, ever......

AI: CCRU was about finding cutting edges of cultural production—microcultures enabled by Capital-driven technological innovation—and engaging, positively, in the transformative processes of dehumanisation, desubjectivisation, and denaturalisation they let loose. In the 1990s, this meant jungle, the internet, drugs, occultism, etc. Thirty years later, cultural production has moved on and the cutting edges have shifted. I think, if you want to continue to catch Ccru signal, you need to resist the urge to reproduce all of those 90s signifiers and instead try to figure out where the cutting edges of dehumanisation, desubjectivsation, and denaturalisation are in culture right now.

4- Considering other theorists like Nyx or Plant will we see a feminine insurrection towards addressing capital's issues ?

AI: As I see it, accelerationism has always been a kind of feminism. If accelerationism is about affirming and participating in those elements of capitalism that decode and

deterritorialise—or dehumanise, desubjectivise, and denaturalise—culture, then it is about participating in a process that is *structurally* feminine.

Along with the patriarchal institutions that support it, what gets most spectacularly uprooted and torn apart by these processes is the notion of the human. As Plant and other cyberfeminists have pointed out, 'human' is a term that has historically been used to exclude women, debarring them from possessing a level of subjecthood equivalent to that of men. So much so that, to paraphrase Plant, 'to be human is to be a Man'. Nyx and Plant both make this distinction ultra-clear, and instead of, like more traditional feminists, asserting women's right to an equivalent level of subjecthood to that of (human) men—a structural position whose power they can see, as accelerationists, is at odds with the future—they affirm the nonhuman, machinic and, emphatically for Nyx's transfeminist g/acc blackpaper, nonnatural status of woman as a positive trait that places her in a position already aligned with futurity.

5- Will trans and enby people all around the globe be able to form great adventures of thought in the future based on the potentiality of their contestative identity ?

MBK: Euphoria comes first, contestation second, identity we can do without. One aspect of *Cute Accelerationism*, from my point of view, is that it's a missive—a love letter, even—from someone who grew up during a period and in an environment where it was far more difficult to escape heteronormativity, to a generation who have been able to explode the whole question of gender and sexuality in such a way that we find ourselves in a 'crisis'. I don't believe we are going to resolve the problems this has produced any time soon, but the crisis is glorious. Nothing has settled, and everything—concepts, bodies, language—is up in the air. The greatest challenge now is to resist our own fear, uncertainty, and doubt and think our way through this mess, which is what we're trying to do. *Cute Accelerationism* is a countergift to those who made it possible for me to become.

6- Is Technocapital gonna turn us all Feminine, Female or something in between ? Is a Plant-Kronic synthesis possible ?

AI: Yes. So long as we understand these as structures, not identities. **:p**

MBK: As we discuss in the book, self-artificialisation, and reversals between subject and object seem to be inherent to the Cute process. In fact one of the other things that brought us to Cute was a discussion about the importance of social media self-presentation for people who are gender-transitioning: once you disseminate your transition out into the world, you make your new self realer, even for yourself; in this case, cuteness involves honing

the just-right version of yourself (*felt cute*), via media which make you more malleable than IRL (…*might delete later*). Subsequently the new form can be transposed, bit by bit, into 'reality', possibly with further deviations. Collective social ratification is an unavoidable part of 'making your gender real', hence the importance of social media. And, as we say, we are fine with treating gender nonconformity as a 'social media plague'—on condition that we view it 'from the virus's point of view', which is as 'Plantian' a slogan as you could hope for.

7- Can an aesthetic project be constructed on the will to becoming-cute ?

MBK: If so, only in the sense in which one can become one's own project, become both the agent, the patient, and the product. And we think it would be a mistake to see this purely as a question of 'aesthetics' in a narrow sense. Cute is an underlying abstract thing that is slowly emerging into human culture and producing multimodal aesthetic phenomena, but it is also a process that we enter into, a set of procedures for disassembly and augmentation.

AI: Although, as Maya says, cute goes beyond aesthetics in a narrow sense, aesthetic properties like visuality, style, fashion, performance, texture, sensuality, taste—all of these things that typically belong to the domain of art are indispensable to any project of becoming-cute, because the cute feedback loop, at least at this juncture in history, runs through the presentation of oneself to others in a social environment. Maybe you could say aesthetics are necessary but not sufficient to cuteness.

Meanwhile, if the contemporary cultural instantiation of cuteness has an aesthetic theory that corresponds to it, it would be something like Azuma Hiroki's database of moé-elements. Moé is a feeling of affection for a two-dimensional character. It's a specifically nonnatural, nonhuman affect. The intensity of moé can be tweaked by playing with configurations of moé-elements. Moé-elements are ontologically diverse, non-totalisable fragments (cat ears, glasses, sleepiness, a way of speaking, a particular personality type) that individually become the site of libidinal investment for connoisseurs of cute manga and anime characters, and which can be transposed onto and across characters in various combinations for the sake of maximising the sensation of moé. The database of moé-elements is the product of the diverse personal tastes of its contributors, and the moé-elements that constitute it become in turn the raw material for the evolution of new tastes, and, taken out of the context of moé, they can become maps for producing cute versions of ourselves. The cat ear phenomenon is a case in point.

To go one step further, I think that when we look at the database model—at this socially constructed register of libidinally invested signs that, as fragments, operate at a level below

that of personal identity, and which can be added, subtracted, reshuffled, and recombined at will—we are looking at the future model of gender. All queer people, even those who are hard masc or hard femme, secretly know the gender binary is over. We all still work within its residual codes, but once you've stepped beyond it, it quickly becomes apparent that it is little more than an ancient relic and that it continues to exist purely for the sake of ensuring queer intelligibility for a cis hegemony desperately in need of orienting coordinates.

8 - Does the book follow a precise methodology towards grasping the main ideas of it ?

MBK: The methodology was, first of all, to give in. In the name of being faithful to our experience, the book does what it says: it commits to the bit, becomes cute, and opens itself up to ridicule, shame, and embarrassment. What we tried to do was to avoid judgement and abandon critical distance. We accept that cuteness can be used in all sorts of ways in culture, but we concentrate on the aspects of Cute that strike us as 'accelerative'.

In the process, we discovered that we have a strange, complementary relation to writing. I struggle with very local intensities, sensory experiences, concentrating hard on them and trying to unlock what it is that perplexes me in them, and that's what leads me to concepts that I find satisfying. Amy likes to start from a massive-scale abstract big picture.

AI: Hehe yeah. It works very well, because when Maya gets overwhelmed, and feels like they have all these little fragments, but they are not yet sure how they are going to connect them together, I can be like, 'Don't worry, I got you, I can see the whole thing and I know the general shape and progression of all the arguments, this bit is going to go here, and this bit is part of that, you can relax'. But then I am hopeless with details. I know what part has to go in what slot, or what is required at a certain point to make sure that everything holds together logically, but then sitting down and crafting those elements in minute detail, especially the sensory stuff, that all takes aeons for me. Maya comes up from below, and I dive down from above, and we meet in the middle, it's a very nice way to write.

Speaking of the overarching structure of the book, it's organised into sections that recreate the plateaus in *A Thousand Plateaus*, including cutified versions of the images that each of the original plateaus begins with. Between them they present an aetiology, an etymology, a history, a libidinal economy, a topology, a symptomatology, a theory of sex, a theory of gender, and a survey of alternative theories of cute (and their shortcomings).

9 - How is your life looking now, with the development of the world and local politics ? Will your work be able to address or at least represent your state of mind in these heavily overwhelming times ?

MBK: There seems to be a general sentiment that things are impossible. But since we have encountered a joy and an intensity that we had previously thought was impossible, that's what we write about. We suggest that, at the level of micropolitics, the disarming effects of Cute upon behavioural norms, particularly those related to male power, make a difference. But we don't claim at any point to be solving social problems or driving political change with philosophy, it would be presumptuous of us to do so and we both find it a distasteful pretention. Above all, we are profoundly uninterested in telling people what they, or 'We', should do.

AI: The power of silliness, irreverence, and joy to create agency and undermine power cannot be underestimated. Take, for instance, Bataille's example of the soldier waiting to be executed by firing squad who looks up at his killers and smiles. Nevertheless, we have been passing through a very conservative intellectual, political, and cultural moment. It's as if everyone feels like the only way we can demonstrate the seriousness of our political commitments is through a kind of performative austerity. I think this is a mistake. And I hope that the things we have been writing and the way we have been writing them will go some way toward counteracting this endemic grimness.

10- Is your contact with ex-CCRU members over ?

MBK: No, we're still in touch with Steve regularly, Amy is working on a forthcoming book with Anna that includes an essay by Suzanne, and she hangs out every now and then with Anna and Nick. Urbanomic just published a Florian Hecker book that features an essay by Luciana. We talk to Sadie every couple of years. You know, everyone has their own projects and has found their own way, but in all cases it owes something to CCRU, and the connection is still there.

11- Has your relationship with Amy changed your vision on anything particular?

MBK: Yes, it changed everything. Everything that's in the book I wouldn't have arrived at without her.

AI: **:)**

12- Is true anti-capitalist love exclusively lesbian, as many claim ?

MBK: We say that cuteness is *at least* hermaphroditic, since Cute involves a set of phenomena that upset the polarity between supposedly male and female behaviours and affects. But when we look at moé, it becomes clear that we are beyond not just the idea of bipolarity, but even its hermaphroditic overcoming. We are in a world where gender and sexuality are being totally disassembled and reassembled in a multitude of different, thoroughly asymmetrical ways.

Whether this is 'anti-capitalist' is another question. As already mentioned, we stick quite closely to the Deleuzo Guattarian reading of capitalism, and prefer to say that the accelerative forces unleashed by capitalism enable certain modes of lovecraft (desiring-production) that run counter to the mechanisms of power inherent to capitalism's reterritorialising tendencies.

13- Is insurrection coming ?

MBK: Certainly not in the form dreamt of by nineteenth-century revolutionaries.

14- Is moe ultimately the same as other anime-based forms ?

MBK: Moé, as we describe in the book, is a word for a type of burning love for anime characters or for particular features of those characters. It is associated with anime and otaku but is not necessarily limited to them. Any kind of passion or desire for the inanimate participates in moé.

AI: As a style or genre, moé is often combined with other subgenres, like denpa (i.e. *Serial Experiments Lain*), but it has a distinct set of tropes, and a distinct stylistic history that comes out of shojo manga—using rounder lines, subtracting detail, dispensing with shading, complex sparkle patterns in characters' eyes, paying attention to frills, ribbons, folds, etc.—it's always actively avoided realism.

15 - Is the Internet nowadays the main focus of theory and philosophy ?

AI: Yes, but in a complicated way. Everything theoretically interesting that is happening right now is happening online, but the people who know what's happening are moving too fast to theorise it, and the people who might be able to theorise it don't know what's happening.

MBK: There are those who are fully participating in the cutting edge of online culture, and are unable to reflect upon it, and there are those who reflect upon it but don't really get it. Methodologically I feel that it's necessary to go all the way to the point of losing yourself in online culture in order to understand where we are culturally. Leave only the slightest, most tenuous possible thread to haul yourself back out of the mire into a place where you can actually think about the horrors you've experienced.

16- Maya, would you consider yourself a multi-disciplinary thinker ?

MBK: I've gradually resigned myself to admitting that I am a dilettante who has *some* knowledge of *a lot* of things.
Since I began Urbanomic in 2007 what I've been interested in is finding a way to do philosophy in a non-academic setting, producing some kind of cultural machine that can survive for a while and produce items that otherwise wouldn't exist. That necessarily implies a conception of philosophy that connects it to other things. Almost all of our projects and publications have lain somewhere on a border between philosophy and music, science, art, or some other practice or discipline.

17- Any particular connection / reflections on the religious and or spiritual ?

MBK: I am and have always been a nihilist; I believe that life without God is the greatest intellectual and cultural adventure, and I am sad whenever I see someone returning to religion.

AI: Same. I will never not be a nihilist. I'm a fan of mysticism though, and anchoresses. And my friend Bogna Konior is always telling me extremely based things about angels and nuns.

18- How do you feel about essentially in a very contradictory sort of way being the historian on the CCRU?

MBK: It's definitely Amy who is the historian of the Ccru. The truth is that I only belonged to the Ccru in the early days, before any of the material in the *Ccru Writings* was produced, although I played some part in developing the microculture from which that all grew. What I

do know is that there is a huge post-Ccru trauma where everyone who was involved doesn't really know what happened and has a sense of the loss of an incredible intensity that was once experienced. Since Amy was in touch with almost everyone involved, she helped me to see that—to understand that it wasn't just me who, decades later, was disturbed and perplexed by what may or may not have happened. Since then I've been circling ground zero trying to work out what I can salvage.

AI: I have a big personal archive of Ccru material, and maybe I even have one of the most exhaustive, multidimensional accounts of Ccru history stored in my brain, but none of that has ever been the basis of my engagement with it. You can't stand outside of Ccru and write a commentary on it and think that you've understood it. You have to participate in it. Find the cutting edge of inhuman cultural production, tune into the signal, build a microculture that feeds off it. Cave Twitter and the Vast Abrupt were examples of that happening for me. Cute/acc is another one. Writing a history of Ccru is a job for someone else.

MBK: Sorry, but realistically, it's your job, otherwise it will end up being shit, haha.

19- Building Urbanomic up to what it is today is an impressive feat, but what sort of issues were encountered along the way? I remember reading a list of submissions banned from Urbanomic just as an example of such an issue that you had, in this case with your readers and their writing.

MBK: I'm not sure what you're referring to, I've never banned anything as far as I know!! Do you mean the list on the website of the type of contributions we don't welcome? It's a joke, but not entirely—we get sent a lot of stuff, none of which we have time to read, and it often falls into those categories. I can't actually remember a single time that someone has sent me something and I've decided to publish it, actually. It just doesn't work like that. I've been personally involved in everything, it's all come through gradually building a web of contacts and friends.

AI: And sometimes working closely with those personal contacts, urging them on, while they slowly and painstakingly produce a book they would otherwise never have thought it possible to write, as was the case with Gilles Grelet's *Theory of the Solitary Sailor*. Maya is a brilliant editor, because they do stuff like this.

20- "Do you think we could ever see a revival of the collapse journal?"

MBK: Yes, eventually, we even have specific volumes planned for the future. Everything else took over, and also, given the growth in scale from volume 1 (273 pages) to volume 8 (1013 pages), it seemed difficult to know where to go with it next. But for me, the idea of *Collapse* is still a touchstone for what Urbanomic is about.

21- "Fisher said "Land was our Nietzsche" in his essay Terminator vs Avatar. Do you relate with this sentiment? Did Land embody a sort of Nietzschean 'Spirit' for the group during his CCRU years, being by all measures and Hyper-Nietzschean, and how did this spirit manifest if it was present?"

MBK: I've written before about my experience of meeting Nick and the influence he had on me. The question of Nietzscheanism is an interesting one, because in some respects, yes, but in some, definitely not, and less so now than ever.

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